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I. INTRODUCTION
Trading publicly listed securities on the open market is markedly
different from traditional face-to-face securities transactions.1  In turn,
the modern-day fraud-on-the-market securities class action bears little
factual resemblance to its common law predecessors, deceit and mis-
representation, which provided conventional contract-based remedies
for fraud in face-to-face dealings.2  And yet, even though securities
laws have detailed pleading standards and nuanced requirements for
“loss causation,” no coherent doctrinal statement exists for calculating
open-market damages in Rule 10b-5 securities fraud class actions.3  In-
1. The key feature of face-to-face transactions for our purposes is that a securities
purchaser buys securities directly from a corporation or a corporate agent and is thus in
privity with the corporation or corporate agent.  Consequently, these transactions differ
notably from open-market transactions where investors trade securities with one another
through the publicly traded securities market. See generally Steven A. Fishman, Duty to Dis-
close Under Rule 10b-5 In Face-to-Face Transactions, 12 J. CORP. L. 251, 256–57 (1987) (outlin-
ing characteristics that distinguish face-to-face transactions from open-market
transactions).
2. See Janet Cooper Alexander, Rethinking Damages in Securities Class Actions, 48 STAN.
L. REV. 1487, 1488 (1996) (“Securities class action litigation today has little in common
with suits over the common law torts of fraud and misrepresentation from which the com-
pensatory remedy was derived.”).
3. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Optimal Damages in Securities Cases, 52
U. CHI. L. REV. 611, 611–12 (1985) (detailing the lack of a standard computation for deter-
mining damages in securities cases).  This Article’s scope is limited exclusively to Rule 10b-
5 actions involving secondary market transactions.  Numerous securities class actions in-
clude claims under sections 11 and 12 of the 1933 Securities Exchange Act and, while the
damages measure under section 11 is similar to Rule 10b-5 cases, this Article focuses on
Rule 10b-5.  Unlike section 11 or Rule 10b-5 cases, to plead a case under section 12, plain-
tiffs do not have to demonstrate that the misrepresentation or omission caused them eco-
nomic harm. In re Daou Sys., Inc., 411 F.3d 1006, 1025, 1027, 1029 (9th Cir. 2005); Casella
v. Webb, 883 F.2d 805, 808 & n.8, 809 (9th Cir. 1989); Rousseff v. E.F. Hutton Co., 867 F.2d
1281, 1284–85 (11th Cir. 1989) (per curiam).
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stead, courts have endeavored to fashion common law deceit and mis-
representation remedies to fit open-market fraud.4  The result is a
relatively ineffective system with a hallmark feature: unpredictable
remedies.  This poses a significant fraud deterrence problem from
both a practical and a theoretical standpoint.
Though precise calculations of loss generally come at the end of
litigation, the legal standard for measuring that loss, and thus for cal-
culating damages, is important at the suit’s outset to determine
whether plaintiffs experienced compensable loss for purposes of
pleading a viable securities fraud action.5  In 2005, the Supreme Court
had an opportunity to clarify what constituted an open-market loss,
which could have facilitated earlier dismissal of cases without reim-
bursable losses.  Instead, dicta in Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo6
further confused the issue of an appropriate remedy by (1) perpetuat-
4. Because a corporation acts only through its agents, the corporation is often re-
quired to compensate investors for its agents’ acts.  Lisa M. Fairfax, Spare the Rod, Spoil the
Director? Revitalizing Directors’ Fiduciary Duty Through Legal Liability, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 393,
412–14 (2005).  The agents themselves may not even be named in the class action and, if
they are, their portion of the settlement payment will likely come from directors’ and of-
ficers’ liability insurance. Id. at 413–14; see also Alexander, supra note 2, at 1498–99 (noting R
that liability insurance often causes directors and officers to contribute very rarely to class
action settlements); Jennifer H. Arlen & William J. Carney, Vicarious Liability for Fraud on
Securities Markets: Theory and Evidence, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 691, 699 (stating that most plain-
tiffs in securities fraud actions sue the corporation rather than its agents).  To achieve
optimal deterrence, John Coffee argues that agents should bear more of the costs of
wrongdoing.  John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay On Deterrence
and Its Implementation 23–24, 27–28 (Columbia Law Sch. Ctr. for Law & Econ. Studies,
Working Paper No. 293, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=893833. But see
Sanjai Bhagat et al., Managerial Indemnification and Liability Insurance: The Effect on Share-
holder Wealth, 54 J. RISK & INS. 721, 726–27 (1987) (noting that reputation costs, such as lost
future earnings and unemployability, that result from losing a lawsuit may deter corporate
agent wrongdoing).  Unless the Department of Justice prosecutes the agents for criminal
actions, at least half of their settlement payment will likely come from insurance policies
paid for by the corporation.  Alexander, supra note 2, at 1498–99. R
5. Although a plaintiff must purchase or sell a security to have standing, she must also
have experienced a loss that results in an injury.  Barr v. Matria Healthcare, Inc., 324 F.
Supp. 2d 1369, 1375–77 (N.D. Ga. 2004); see also Miller v. Asensio & Co., 364 F.3d 223, 230
(4th Cir. 2004) (“Requiring plaintiffs to demonstrate the fact of proximately caused dam-
age to establish 10b-5 liability precludes wholly speculative claims and claims by plaintiffs
who ultimately profit from, or experience no economic pinch as a result of, the challenged
transaction.”); Wolf v. Frank, 477 F.2d 467, 478–79 (5th Cir. 1973) (stating that plaintiffs
have standing only when they can show actual damages rather than merely loss of specula-
tive profits).
6. 544 U.S. 336 (2005).  Several commentators have discussed the impact of Dura. See,
e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Causation by Presumption? Why the Supreme Court Should Reject Phantom
Losses and Reverse Broudo, 60 BUS. LAW. 533 (2005) (arguing, pre-decision, that Dura
presented an opportunity to preclude suits for “phantom losses”); John C. Coffee, Jr., Loss
Causation After ‘Dura’: Something for Everyone, 231 N.Y. L.J. 5 (2005) [hereinafter Coffee, Loss
Causation] (discussing Dura’s ambiguous dicta regarding loss causation); Larry E. Ribstein,
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ing the idea that courts can tailor remedies for open-market fraud by
employing principles from common law deceit and misrepresentation
actions despite the factual disparities between the two, and (2) open-
ing the door to a new form of hypothetical loss where the stock price
increases after an opportune disclosure of fraud.7  Although Dura di-
minished plaintiffs’ ability to sue based on alleged purchase price in-
flation, its dicta, which indicated that plaintiffs might be able to
recover when their share prices did not increase as much as they oth-
erwise would have without the discovery of fraud, muddied the water
with regard to what constituted loss.
The Supreme Court’s insinuation that a new form of hypothetical
losses might be recoverable destabilizes the general notion that plain-
tiffs are entitled to compensation only for their out-of-pocket losses.
Usually, when a corporation discloses a previous unfavorable misrep-
resentation or omission, its stock price drops.  This decline indicates
that the investing public considered the information relevant.8  In
Dura, the Court implied that an investor might recover damages when
a stock’s price does not increase as much as it would have absent the
fraud.9  In other words, if a corporation bundles adverse and favorable
information that causes its stock price to increase, an investor without
any net loss might be able to sue.  This suggests that plaintiffs may not
be limited to damages for traditional out-of-pocket losses.10  A number
of intrinsic problems could result from compensating investors for
more than these losses.  To cite but one example, providing investors
with a double recovery, that is, one from the net stock price increase
Fraud on a Noisy Market, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 137, 153–55 (2006) (noting that Dura
failed to clarify the application of the fraud-on-the market theory).
7. Dura, 544 U.S. at 343–44.  More specifically, Dura indicated that “private securities
fraud actions resemble in many (but not all) respects common-law deceit and misrepresen-
tation actions” and that litigants should examine these common law roots to determine
whether a plaintiff suffered an injury and economic loss. Id.  The Dura Court also noted, in
a parenthetical, that “[t]he same is true in respect to a claim that a share’s higher price is
lower than it would otherwise have been—a claim we do not consider here.” Id. at 343.  As
Coffee later observed, for the Court “to raise this issue is to suggest that it stands on the
same logical footing as price inflation that results in a stock price decline.”  Coffee, Loss
Causation, supra note 6.  Even before Dura, some courts suggested in dicta that stockholders R
may experience an actionable loss if, because of the fraudulent conduct, a stock’s apprecia-
tion does not rise as much as it otherwise would.  Gebhardt v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 335
F.3d 824, 831–32 (8th Cir. 2003).
8. Coffee, Loss Causation, supra note 6. R
9. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. R
10. Securities fraud cases on the open market have typically involved a decline in the
stock price after the disclosure of wrongdoing.
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\66-2\MLR202.txt unknown Seq: 5 12-FEB-07 15:33
352 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 66:348
and one from class action damages, could create a perverse incentive
to invest purposefully in companies showing signs of fraud.11
To illustrate the potential effects of Dura’s dicta, consider the fol-
lowing situation:
“We’ve Found Gold!,” claims Corporation in a half-page press
release in the New York Times.  Corporation’s stock price in-
creases from $10 per share to $50 per share.  An investor
calls her broker and purchases ten shares at $50 per share.
Three months later, Corporation announces in two-inch,
bold, capital letters, “We’ve Found Platinum!”  Beneath the
capitals, miniscule text disclaims “but not gold.”  The inves-
tor’s stock soars to $200 per share—but she wants to recover
for the inflation in her purchase price based upon the gold
misrepresentation.12
After Dura, assuming that she could meet the other elements of a
claim, this investor may be able to maintain a securities class action
against Corporation even though she did not suffer any out-of-pocket
losses.13  Although some have argued that courts should expand pri-
vate litigation remedies to deter this type of opportune disclosure,14
the better view is that courts should limit recovery to out-of-pocket
losses and recognize that private remedies need not be invariably co-
extensive with enforcement by the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion (SEC).15
11. One obvious ex ante indicium of fraud includes accounting restatements.  Stephen
J. Choi, The Evidence on Securities Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1465, 1499 (2004).
12. This example is adapted from the Supreme Court’s oral argument in Dura.  Tran-
script of Oral Argument at 7–10, Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 (2005) (No.
03-932), 2005 WL 236546.  If the gold-platinum scenario sounds too hypothetical, consider
a pharmaceutical company that announces higher than expected profits to create a market
frenzy and later issues both a revised 10K filing revealing its past financial woes and an
announcement that it has received FDA approval for a new cancer-fighting drug.
13. The oral argument in Dura contemplates but does not resolve this scenario. Id.
For another example, see In re Columbia Sec. Litig., 155 F.R.D. 466, 483 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)
(observing that the failure of the price to drop as a result of alleged misrepresentations did
not preclude a fraud-on-the-market claim because the misrepresentations might have pre-
vented a rise in the price that otherwise would have occurred).  Likewise, the court in
Gebhardt v. ConAgra Foods, Inc. seemed to think that plaintiffs should be able to recover in
this situation.  335 F.3d 824, 831–32 (8th Cir. 2003) (noting that “stockholders can be
damaged in ways other than seeing their stocks decline.  If a stock does not appreciate as it
would have absent the fraudulent conduct, investors have suffered a harm.”).
14. See, e.g., Merritt B. Fox, Understanding Dura, 60 BUS. LAW. 1547, 1558–59 (2005)
(arguing that courts should accept a variety of evidence to demonstrate price inflation and
that a price drop is not necessary for recovery).
15. Although this Article is not necessarily a defense of the securities class action—
particularly when investors have not suffered out-of-pocket losses—the securities class ac-
tion has been defended in numerous circumstances. See, e.g., James D. Cox, Making Securi-
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Private class action litigation is problematic in the gold-platinum
hypothetical because investors were already financially advantaged
when the price appreciated above the purchase price.  Yet permitting
corporate agents to escape liability through opportune disclosures16
impugns the stock market’s integrity and could adversely affect the
economy.  Still, the option is not between private litigation and no
enforcement.  Even without a private remedy, the SEC, the Depart-
ment of Justice, and the exchanges themselves can penalize corporate
wrongdoing.17  As such, limiting the availability of private class actions
when investors do not experience an out-of-pocket loss does not mean
that fraud would go undeterred or unpunished.  Yet, without a clear
doctrinal statement limiting recovery to out-of-pocket losses, the se-
curities class action is arguably available to recoup the purchase price
inflation in situations similar to the gold misrepresentation.
Compensating investors (who are corporate shareholders) when
the net stock price increases injures investors by requiring them to pay
significant transaction costs, such as attorneys’ fees, to transfer wealth
from one pocket to another.  When investors sue a corporation, its
shareholders indirectly bear those costs.  Because investors are diversi-
fied, they may belong to the shareholder group indirectly paying for
the litigation on one day and may be in the class of investors suing a
corporation on the next.  Thus, in the aggregate, compensating diver-
sified investors when the net stock price increases is a costly means for
wealth redistribution.
Part II begins with a brief overview of securities laws to provide a
contextual framework for approaching damage awards.  Part II then
follows Dura’s directive to examine common law deceit and misrepre-
sentation actions for guidance on economic loss and damages in mod-
ern securities fraud awards.18  As a result, Part II also reviews courts’
ties Fraud Class Actions Virtuous, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 497, 509–15 (1997) (defending securities
class actions as a deterrence of securities violations through entity liability).
16. Under the federal securities laws, certain corporations have a duty to disclose all
material information whether it is positive or negative.  Fishman, supra note 1, at 260–61.
The use of “disclosure” in this Article implies bad news and that any subsequent class litiga-
tion is comprised of purchasers who allege that they bought the security based on a misrep-
resentation or omission.
17. E.g., SEC v. Rind, 991 F.2d 1486, 1490 (9th Cir. 1993).  Unlike private actions, the
SEC need not prove reliance or causation of damage or injury to maintain a claim. E.g.,
SEC v. Rana Research, Inc., 8 F.3d 1358, 1363 n.4 (9th Cir. 1993); 5 ALAN R. BROMBERG &
LEWIS D. LOWENFELS, BROMBERG AND LOWENFELS ON SECURITIES FRAUD & COMMODITIES
FRAUD § 9:1 (2d ed. 2006).
18. Securities fraud damages have long vexed courts.  Robert B. Thompson, “Simplicity
and Certainty” in the Measure of Recovery Under Rule 10b-5, 51 BUS. LAW. 1177, 1179 (1996).
Two suggestions in Dura could increase unpredictability in awarding damages and thereby
decrease deterrence.  First, Dura hints that plaintiffs might be able to sue when a security’s
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criteria for awarding common law contract- and equity-based damages
to determine whether the criteria also apply to open-market securities
violations.
Part III considers normative theories justifying the private securi-
ties class action as an enforcement tool.  Even though recovering dam-
ages after plaintiffs experience a net gain is problematic under the
current system, perhaps the system should change if recovery further
promoted the goals of the securities class action.  Yet, after analyzing
compensation and deterrence as possible goals, I conclude that com-
pensating plaintiffs for net gains redistributes wealth among diversi-
fied shareholders (minus significant transaction costs) and may cause
perverse effects on investor education and motivation.  Instead, deter-
rence is the most substantiated rationale for private recovery.  Never-
theless, without defining a criterion for awarding damages, the
unpredictable nature of remedies in private class actions may decrease
deterrence.  To foster optimal deterrence, courts need a distinct
method for calculating open-market loss.  Part IV proposes that this
method limit recovery to out-of-pocket losses and thus compensate
only net losers from the fraud.  Part IV also identifies and discusses
the practical and theoretical ramifications of this limitation.
My inquiry throughout this Article focuses exclusively on reme-
dies for open-market securities fraud in class action lawsuits; I do not
advocate changing remedies for face-to-face transactions or for more
traditional nonclass suits.  This Article takes for granted that the SEC,
the Department of Justice, and the exchanges coexist with private liti-
gation to deter fraud; that private class-based litigation can deter fraud
with appropriate damage restrictions in place; that it is (sometimes)
desirable to enforce Rule 10b-5 against non-issuing corporate defend-
ants; and that courts will continue to use the fraud-on-the-market the-
ory, at least for awhile, despite numerous academic challenges to the
efficient capital markets hypothesis.  These assumptions are subject to
ongoing debate, but they are beyond the scope of this Article’s focus
on determining (1) whether the system should compensate investors
through private actions when their stock price does not increase as
much as it would have absent fraud, and (2) whether limiting inves-
tors to out-of-pocket losses in this regard could bolster fraud
deterrence.
higher trading price is lower than it might have been absent the fraud. Dura, 544 U.S. at
343.  Second, Dura observes that private securities fraud class actions resemble common
law deceit and misrepresentation actions—actions which permitted damages apart from
out-of-pocket losses. Id. at 343–44.
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II. MEASURING DAMAGES FROM OPEN-MARKET LOSS
The appropriate method for calculating economic loss and
awarding damages for open-market fraud has long proved problem-
atic for courts.19  In private securities fraud litigation, class actions or
otherwise, damages are an essential prerequisite for maintaining a
claim.20  Yet because securities fraud class action cases generally settle
before courts calculate damages, judicial opinions are scarce.21  Ac-
cordingly, this Part begins with a brief overview of securities laws to
contextualize the purpose of private remedies.
A. Contextualizing Securities Laws to Frame an Understanding of
Damage Awards
As early as 1975, the Supreme Court recognized that the securi-
ties class action “presents a danger of vexatiousness different in de-
gree and in kind from that which accompanies litigation in general.”22
Consequently, during the 1990s, Congress passed the Private Securi-
ties Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA)23 to rein in prolific use of
the 1933 and 1934 Exchange Acts.24
19. Thompson, supra note 18, at 1179. R
20. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4) (2000); see also Dura, 544 U.S. at 341–42.
21. Miller v. Asensio & Co., 364 F.3d 223, 228 (4th Cir. 2004) (“The treatises note the
‘relative paucity of decisions’ dealing with damages in Rule 10b-5 cases.” (quoting 2
THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 12.12 (4th ed. 2002)); 5 BROM-
BERG & LOWENFELS, supra note 17, § 8.10 & n.6; Bradford Cornell & R. Gregory Morgan, R
Using Finance Theory to Measure Damages in Fraud on the Market Cases, 37 UCLA L. REV. 883,
884 & n.5 (1990); Donald C. Langevoort, Capping Damages for Open-Market Securities Fraud,
38 ARIZ. L. REV. 639, 648 (1996); Daniel P. Lefler & Allan W. Kleidon, Just How Much
Damage Did Those Misrepresentations Actually Cause and to Whom?: Damages Measurement in
“Fraud on the Market” Securities Class Actions, in SECURITIES LITIGATION & ENFORCEMENT INSTI-
TUTE 2005, at 285, 289 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice, Course Handbook Series No. 6746,
2005); Thompson, supra note 18, at 1179. R
22. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 739 (1975).
23. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 15 U.S.C.).
24. Id. (amending Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 77z-1 (2000)) and Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4)).  The PSLRA has been criticized for making it more
difficult to bring class actions in general rather than weeding out the non-meritorious
ones. See, e.g., A.C. Pritchard, Markets as Monitors: A Proposal to Replace Class Actions with
Exchanges as Securities Fraud Enforcers, 85 VA. L. REV. 925, 960 (1999) (“But the procedural
obstacles of the Reform Act do not screen out only frivolous suits: Instead, the Reform Act
makes it harder to bring class actions, whatever their individual merit.”).  Certainly not
everyone believed that securities class actions caused all of the pernicious effects that the
proponents of the PSLRA and the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act (SLUSA)
attributed to them. See, e.g., Joseph A. Grundfest, Why Disimply?, 108 HARV. L. REV. 727,
743–44 (1995) (arguing that the SEC and courts are too readily persuaded that private
securities litigation is the source of unnecessary cost and meritless suits).
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In passing the PSLRA, Congress stated that private securities liti-
gation was “an indispensable tool with which defrauded investors can
recover their losses.”25  But it also alleged that the class action device,
as then used in securities litigation, injured the entire U.S. economy.26
The Act’s supporters claimed that class action lawyers filed frivolous
complaints27 and targeted deep-pocketed defendants,28 which pro-
duced blackmail settlements,29 discouraged qualified people from
serving on boards of directors,30 and placed heavy economic burdens
on both corporations and the economy as a whole.31
As a result of these arguments, Title I of the PSLRA limits recov-
erable damages and attorneys’ fees,32 creates a “safe harbor” for for-
ward-looking statements,33 requires sanctions for frivolous litigation,34
and provides a mechanism to stay discovery pending a judicial review
of a motion to dismiss.35  The limit on recoverable damages entitles
25. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 126 S. Ct. 1503, 1510 (2006)
(quoting H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 31 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 730).
26. H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 31–32, as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 730–31.
27. See Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 306 (2d Cir. 2000) (“Legislators were apparently
motivated in large part by a perceived need to deter strike suits wherein opportunistic
private plaintiffs file securities fraud claims of dubious merit in order to exact large settle-
ment recoveries.”).
28. H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 31, as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 730.
29. For a discussion of the general theory of blackmail in the class action setting, see L.
Elizabeth Chamblee, Unsettling Efficiency: When Non-Class Aggregation of Mass Torts Creates
Second-Class Settlements, 65 LA. L. REV. 157, 222–24 (2004).
30. S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 21 (1995), as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 700.
31. See Chamblee, supra note 29, at 224 (stating that settlements from class action law- R
suits are problematic because the result often reflects a company’s fear of catastrophic loss
instead of the merits of the plaintiff’s position).
32. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(e) (2000).
33. “Deterrence is further undermined by the safe harbor that the Reform Act creates
for forward-looking statements.  The safe harbor immunizes such statements if they were
not knowingly false when made, a departure from the ordinary standard of recklessness.”
Pritchard, supra note 24, at 962. R
34. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(c); see also Choi, supra note 11, at 1472 (“PSLRA contains an R
explicit requirement that courts must review a class action on the merits . . . and impose
sanctions, including the defendants’ attorneys’ fees, on frivolous litigation.”).
35. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (b)(3)(B); see also Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v.
Dabit, 126 S. Ct. 1503, 1511 (2006) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 as authorizing a stay of discov-
ery pending resolution of any motion to dismiss); Felton v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter &
Co., 429 F. Supp. 2d 684, 689–90 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (same).  Some have observed that these
reforms crippled the securities class action and undermined its application to, for exam-
ple, forward-looking statements. See, e.g., Cox, supra note 15, at 520–21 (noting that discov- R
ery plays a particularly important role in suits alleging misrepresentation in forward-
looking statements).  Others have argued that the PSLRA may chill meritorious actions just
as much as it does frivolous actions. See generally Hillary A. Sale, Heightened Pleadings and
Discovery Stays: An Analysis of the Effect of the PSLRA’s Internal-Information Standard on ’33 and
’34 Act Claims, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 537 (1998) (arguing that the pleading requirements im-
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plaintiffs to receive only the difference between the sale price of the
security and the security’s mean price over a ninety-day period follow-
ing the disclosure of the information.36  Title I also heightened plead-
ing requirements for section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 claims by
mandating that plaintiffs specify each misleading statement and pro-
vide particular facts “giving rise to a strong inference that the defen-
dant acted with the required state of mind.”37  Even though Congress
has demonstrated a steadfast commitment to insuring market integ-
rity, most of Congress’s reforms have erected barriers to class action
recovery.
Stringent pleading requirements are one of the principal barri-
ers.  Plaintiffs must allege the following elements to state a claim for
cases involving publicly traded securities: (1) a material misrepresen-
tation or omission; (2) scienter, i.e., a wrongful state of mind; (3) a
connection with the purchase or sale of a security; (4) reliance; (5)
economic loss; and (6) loss causation.38  For loss causation and stand-
ing purposes, plaintiffs must allege an injury to a legally protected in-
terest as well as a causal relationship between the injury (the
economic loss) and the defendant’s conduct.39  Defendant’s conduct
posed by PSLRA are outcome determinative and consequently lead to the dismissal of even
meritorious suits). A major problem with the rule is that many times the use of discovery is
the only way that plaintiffs can uncover viable facts to plead a strong inference of wrongdo-
ing. See Pritchard, supra note 24, at 961 (“The discovery stay prevents plaintiffs from using R
discovery to draft a viable complaint.”); see also Jordan Eth & Michael Dicke, Insider Stock
Sales in Rule 10b-5 Corporate Disclosure Cases: Separating the Innocent from the Suspicious, 1 STAN.
J.L. BUS. & FIN. 97, 105 (1994) (stating that direct evidence of scienter, a necessary element
for a securities class action claim, is usually nonexistent at the pre-discovery stage of trial).
36. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(e)(1).  Still, this leaves open the possibility of recovery insinuated
by Dura, that a plaintiff might recover when the price does not increase as much as it
otherwise would have.  See Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 343 (2005).
37. Dura, 544 U.S. at 345 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1)–(2)).  Professors Grundfest
and Pritchard have commented on the legislative ambiguity of “strong inference.”  Joseph
A. Grundfest & A.C. Pritchard, Statutes with Multiple Personality Disorders: The Value of Ambigu-
ity in Statutory Design and Interpretation, 54 STAN. L. REV. 627, 633–34 (2002) (noting that
Congress intentionally made the strong inference standard ambiguous and sorting thirty-
three appellate court interpretations of the standard into three distinct categories).  The
strong inference standard first appeared in Senate Bill 240.  Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995, S. 240, 104th Cong. § 36(b) (1995).
38. Dura, 544 U.S. at 341–42.
39. With regard to loss causation, “the plaintiff shall have the burden of proving that
the act or omission of the defendant alleged to violate this chapter caused the loss for
which the plaintiff seeks to recover damages.”  15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4); see also Barr v.
Matria Healthcare, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 2d 1369, 1379 (N.D. Ga. 2004).  With regard to stand-
ing, the plaintiff must prove three elements: an injury in fact, a causal relationship between
the injury and the challenged conduct, and a likelihood that the injury will be redressed by
a favorable decision.  Lee v. City of Chicago, 330 F.3d 456, 468 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992)); see also Pasley v. Freeman, 100
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must, therefore, proximately cause the plaintiffs’ loss.40
Causation has two components: transaction causation and loss
causation.41  Because many individuals turn their finances over to in-
vestment brokers and might not be aware of a misstatement (or omis-
sion), much less have relied on it, plaintiffs may plead transactional
causation by alleging “fraud-on-the-market” if the market is “effi-
cient.”42  The fraud-on-the-market theory establishes a rebuttable pre-
sumption that investors rely on material representations made to the
public in determining whether to buy or sell a particular security.43
Eng. Rep. 450, 457 (K.B. 1789) (“If, indeed, no injury is occasioned by the lie, it is not
actionable: but if it be attended with a damage, it then becomes the subject of an action.”).
40. See Theoharous v. Fong, 256 F.3d 1219, 1224 (11th Cir. 2001) (“A successful cause
of action under Section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5 requires that the plaintiff prove (1) a misstate-
ment or omission (2) of a material fact (3) made with scienter (4) upon which the plaintiff
relied (5) that proximately caused the plaintiff’s loss.” (quoting McDonald v. Alan Bush Broker-
age Co., 863 F.2d 809, 814 (11th Cir. 1989)) (emphasis added)); Binder v. Gillespie, 184
F.3d 1059, 1063 (9th Cir. 1999) (same); Ross v. Bank S., N.A., 885 F.2d 723, 728 (11th Cir.
1989) (en banc) (same); Friedlander v. Troutman, Sanders, Lockerman & Ashmore, 788
F.2d 1500, 1503 n.3 (11th Cir. 1986) (quoting Diamond v. Lamotte, 709 F.2d 1419,
1422–23 (11th Cir. 1983) (same)); In re HealthSouth Corp. Sec. Litig., 213 F.R.D. 447, 457
(N.D. Ala. 2003) (same).
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 forbids (1) the “use or em-
ploy[ment]” of any “deceptive device,” (2) “in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security,” and (3) “in contravention of” SEC rules and regulations.  15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).
41. Robbins v. Koger Props., Inc., 116 F.3d 1441, 1447 (11th Cir. 1997); see also Emer-
gent Capital Inv. Mgmt., LLC v. Stonepath Group, Inc., 343 F.3d 189, 196–97 (2d Cir.
2003) (distinguishing transaction causation from loss causation).
42. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 247 (1988).  For an explanation of how Basic
fits into the subsequent work of behavioral finance researchers, see Ribstein, supra note 6, R
at 148–50.
Academics have repeatedly challenged the validity of the efficient market theory.  Al-
though academic debate over market efficiency continues, as Donald Langevoort observes,
the fraud-on-the-market theory can be justified regardless of whether markets are efficient.
Donald C. Langevoort, Theories, Assumptions, and Securities Regulation: Market Efficiency Revis-
ited, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 851, 892–903 (1992).
43. See Semerenko v. Cendant Corp., 223 F.3d 165, 178–79 (3d Cir. 2000) (explaining
the fraud-on-the-market theory of reliance); In re Salomon Analyst Metromedia Litig., 236
F.R.D. 208, 220 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (same); O’Neil v. Appel, 165 F.R.D. 479, 500 (W.D. Mich.
1996) (same); In re Phillips Petroleum Sec. Litig., 738 F. Supp. 825, 836 (D. Del. 1990)
(applying the fraud-on-the-market theory).
Some have argued that the loss causation element is inapplicable to fraud-on-the-mar-
ket transactions because the injury “flows directly from the misstatement.” See, e.g., Fox,
supra note 14, at 1549–50.  This oversimplifies the issue.  As we have seen, when a misrepre- R
sentation fails to produce economic damage, but the stock price declines because of mar-
ket conditions, then a plaintiff should not be able to recover.  The misstatement was (a)
not material as evidenced by a lack of market response and (b) not the product of the later
loss.  To hold otherwise is to provide investor insurance for tough market conditions.
Dura, 544 U.S. at 342–46 (rejecting the Ninth Circuit rule that an initially inflated price
necessarily allows a plaintiff to recover damages, and holding that a plaintiff may only
recover if he or she suffers economic losses caused by a defendant’s misrepresentation).
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Thus, the theory satisfies both reliance and transaction causa-
tion.44  To satisfy the second causation component, loss causation, the
plaintiffs must establish that the defendant “caused the loss for which
the plaintiff[s] seeks to recover damages.”45  And yet, even though
they are interrelated, loss causation, economic loss, and damages are
each distinct.  As measured by the out-of-pocket rule, damages com-
pensate plaintiffs only for losses actually caused by a misrepresenta-
tion or omission.46
B. Dura’s Potential Impact on Remedies
The few opinions available on open-market damages generally
limit plaintiffs’ recovery to out-of-pocket losses; yet, the damage issue
has been subject to ongoing debate in the lower courts.47  The Su-
preme Court had the opportunity to end this debate in Dura but
opted to issue a narrow opinion instead.48  This Section briefly exam-
ines Dura, both in terms of what the decision did and did not do, and
aims to progress beyond the current confusion over remedies by ex-
ploring its sources.
In Dura, the plaintiffs alleged that Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
made false statements about its profits and about the Food and Drug
Administration’s (FDA) likely approval of its asthmatic spray device.49
When Dura later disclosed that its earnings would not be as high as
expected due to slow drug sales, its shares lost almost one-half of their
value.50  Eight months later, when it announced that the FDA would
not approve the device, its market price fell again.51  This time, the
stock price recovered within a week.52  Even though the stock price
recovered quickly, plaintiffs argued that they suffered a loss by paying
artificially inflated prices for Dura’s stock.53
44. Dura, 544 U.S. at 341–42; Basic, 485 U.S. at 241–42; Robbins, 116 F.3d at 1448; see
also Edward A. Dyl, Estimating Economic Damages in Class Actions Securities Fraud Litigation, 12
J. FORENSIC ECON. 1, 1 (1999).
45. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4).
46. Robbins, 116 F.3d at 1447 n.5.
47. See supra Part II.A.
48. Dura, 544 U.S. at 346.
49. Id. at 339.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 340.  This type of allegation did not adequately plead loss causation because a
purchaser could quickly sell the shares before the relevant truth began to leak out.  Thus, a
seller’s alleged misrepresentation (and its associated inflated price) did not invariably lead
to a loss, but it might mean a later loss.  Accordingly, loss causation limits a plaintiff’s
recovery for out-of-pocket damages when the loss caused by the fraud is actually less than
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Although a number of commentators anticipated a decision that
plaintiffs could not plead loss causation without demonstrating a de-
cline in stock value and thus a net loss,54 the Court’s decision settled
only one issue: a plaintiff who alleges and establishes that the defen-
dant has made a materially false statement does not sufficiently estab-
lish loss causation without connecting the loss to the
misrepresentation.55  This holding may change the way that corpora-
tions reveal adverse information.  For example, after Dura, the corpo-
ration may bundle adverse and favorable information, as in the gold-
platinum hypothetical, in order to prevent a stock price decline.56
The Court also recognized that intervening factors could cause a
lower price instead of the misrepresentation, but then it added in
dicta: “The same is true in respect to a claim that a share’s higher
price is lower than it would otherwise have been—a claim we do not
consider here.”57  The Court then reemphasized the importance of
common law deceit and misrepresentation actions in deciphering
remedies for economic loss.58
C. The Evolution of Securities Fraud Damages
Even though modern-day securities fraud shares some elements
with common law deceit and misrepresentation actions, courts apply-
ing the common law dealt primarily with non-liquid markets and face-
to-face transactions.  Because of these differences, courts did not limit
common law damage awards to out-of-pocket losses.59  Instead, they
the out-of-pocket measure.  See id. at 342–43 (stating that a higher purchase price will some-
times play a role in bringing about future loss).
54. See, e.g., Coffee, Loss Causation, supra note 6, at 1 (stating that the Supreme Court R
was expected to define operative principles of loss causation in Dura, but instead the Court
issued a narrow holding).
55. Fox, supra note 14, at 1550–51 (stating that the Dura Court crafted a narrow R
holding).
56. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Litigation: New Doctrine Spawns New Tactics, 235 N.Y. L.J. 1
(2006) (suggesting that Dura may encourage companies to release adverse and favorable
information together in one disclosure package to avoid liability).
57. Dura, 544 U.S. at 343; see also supra note 7 and accompanying text. R
58. Dura, 544 U.S. at 343.
59. The elements for common law fraud are similar to the elements for pleading secur-
ities fraud.  At common law, the plaintiff had to demonstrate by “clear and decisive proof”:
[t]hat the defendant has made a representation in regard to a material fact . . .
[t]hat such representation is false; . . . [t]hat such representation was not actually
believed by the defendant, on reasonable grounds, to be true; . . . [t]hat it was
made with intent that it should be acted on; . . . [t]hat it was acted on by com-
plainant to his damage; and, . . . [t]hat in so acting on it the complainant was
ignorant of its falsity, and reasonably believed it to be true.
S. Dev. Co. v. Silva, 125 U.S. 247, 250 (1888).  The Dura Court cited Southern Development Co.
for this proposition.  544 U.S. at 343.
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fashioned awards out of numerous damage theories including the
benefit-of-the-bargain rule,60 the out-of-pocket rule,61 disgorgement,62
and rescission.63  One commentator noted that the cases contain “a
me´lange of rules” and that “all too often a court will give up and an-
nounce that the district court has discretion to fashion ‘a remedy to
suit the particular case’—as if there were no need for legal rules to
evaluate the significance and effects of the facts of ‘the particular
case.’”64  Nevertheless, given the potential for Dura to affect class rem-
edies in new ways, this Section traces the development from common
law deceit and misrepresentation remedies to remedies for face-to-
face transactions to open-market fraud.  It then explains why some of
these common law principles do not hold true for modern fraud-on-
the-market actions.
1. The Confusing Common Law Origins of Securities Fraud Remedies
In the early 1600s, deceit claims existed only for what is today
termed a “breach of warranty.”  In the seminal common law damages
60. See, e.g., Osofsky v. Zipf, 645 F.2d 107, 114 (2d Cir. 1981) (applying the benefit-of-
the-bargain rule to determine damages caused by the defendant’s misrepresentation in
proxy solicitation materials). But see Smith v. Bolles, 132 U.S. 125, 129–30 (1889) (re-
jecting the benefit-of-the-bargain rule because it included the “expected fruits of an unreal-
ized speculation”).  For a discussion of Bolles, see Michael J. Kaufman, No Foul, No Harm:
The Real Measure of Damages Under Rule 10b-5, 39 CATH. U. L. REV. 29, 35–36 (1989).
61. In Levine v. Seilon, Inc., for example, the court stated:
Under the ‘general’ laws regime of Swift v. Tyson, the rule in the federal courts
was that a defrauded buyer of securities is entitled to recover only the excess of
what he paid over the value of what he got, not, as some other courts had held,
the difference between the value of what he got and what it was represented he
would be getting.
439 F.2d 328, 334 (2d Cir. 1971) (citation omitted).
62. For example, in Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, the Court stated:
In our view, the correct measure of damages under § 28 of the Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78bb(a), is the difference between the fair value of all that the . . . seller re-
ceived and the fair value of what he would have received had there been no fraud-
ulent conduct, except for the situation where the defendant received more than
the seller’s actual loss.  In the latter case damages are the amount of the defen-
dant’s profit.
406 U.S. 128, 155 (1972) (citation omitted).
63. See, e.g., Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 49 & nn.21–22 (2d Cir.
1978) (explaining and applying the rescission measure of damages). But see Green v. Occi-
dental Petroleum Corp., 541 F.2d 1335, 1342 (9th Cir. 1976) (Sneed, J., concurring) (argu-
ing that recission is an inappropriate measure of damages because it requires the
defendant to compensate the plaintiff for losses in stock value not proximately caused by
the defendant’s wrong).  As to the different types of damages, see W. PAGE KEETON ET AL.,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 110 (5th ed. 1984); Kaufman, supra note 60, at 30–31. R
64. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 3, at 611–12 (quoting Hackbart v. Holmes, 675 R
F.2d 1114, 1121 (10th Cir. 1982)).
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case, Chandelor v. Lopus,65 the Exchequer Chamber reversed the Kings
Bench’s judgment in the plaintiff’s favor because no breach of war-
ranty occurred—the defendant never warranted that the object in
question was a “bezar-stone.”66  Yet at least some justices believed that
the defendant’s intent to deceive was actionable even without a war-
ranty.67  The dissenters’ line of thinking continued to develop
through the years, and by the late eighteenth century, the law was
relatively well established that (1) if there was an express or implied
warranty, the seller could be liable if the product did not conform to
the warranty’s specifications, and (2) if no warranty existed, the seller
could be liable only where she made a false statement, knew of its
falsity, and intended to deceive the buyer.68
Of course, a breach of warranty action is founded in contract law
whereas deceit is a tort.  Though the difference initially appears to be
either the presence or absence of a warranty, this simplistic differenti-
ation caused multiple procedural and pleading issues because plain-
tiffs often hedged their bets by alleging both breach of warranty and
deceit.69  Hence, in common law deceit and misrepresentation ac-
tions, courts chose among a buffet of remedies.70  Depending upon
the circumstances, a common law claim for deceit could prompt the
following counts in a complaint: (1) breach of warranty and breach of
contract—requesting benefit-of-the-bargain, or “expectation” dam-
ages—to restore the plaintiff to the position she would have occupied
with the defendant’s contractual performance;71 (2) misrepresenta-
65. 79 Eng. Rep. 3, Cro. Jac. 4 (Ex. Ch. 1603).
66. Id. at 3–4; see also Paula J. Dalley, The Law of Deceit, 1790–1860: Continuity Amidst
Change, 39 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 405, 412 (1995) (discussing Chandelor v. Lopus).  A bezar
stone is a hard gastric or intestinal mass found in the intestine of hooved animals that was
believed to be a universal antidote against poisons. Id. at 412 n.27.  Unfortunately, the
court in Chandelor does not explain how the buyer realized that the bezar stone did not
work.
67. Chandelor, 79 Eng. Rep. at 4; see also Lopus v. Chandelor (K.B. 1606), reprinted in
J.H. BAKER & S.F.C. MILSOM, SOURCES OF ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 518–23 (1986).
68. Dalley, supra note 66, at 413; see also Stuart v. Wilkins, 99 Eng. Rep. 15 (K.B. 1778) R
(noting that an implied warranty will not arise unless the seller knows of the defect and still
demands a sound price).
69. See, e.g., Bartholomew v. Bushnell, 20 Conn. 271, 271 (1850); see also Dalley, supra
note 66, at 415 (noting that a sophisticated plaintiff alleges both breach of warranty and R
deceit).
70. Thompson, supra note 18, at 1183–85; Robert B. Thompson, The Measure of Recovery R
Under Rule 10b-5: A Restitution Alternative to Tort Damages, 37 VAND. L. REV. 349, 353–54
(1984).
71. Note, however, that the Uniform Commercial Code does not explicitly recognize
an implied warranty of merchantability or fitness with regard to securities. See U.C.C. § 2-
105(1) (1977) (defining “goods” as exclusive of securities); id. § 2-314 (recognizing an
implied warranty of merchantability for goods); id §  2-315 (recognizing an implied war-
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tion—a tort—which could provide recoupment for out-of-pocket
losses; and (3) unjust enrichment—an equitable claim—which might
require the defendant to return the illicit profit from the transaction
or rescind the transaction altogether.72
2. Remedies for Fraudulent Face-to-Face Transactions
Over the years, courts blurred the distinct remedies for these
multiple causes of action, which contributed to modern-day confusion
over the appropriate remedy for open-market securities fraud.73  Still,
the courts did not move directly from common law deceit and misrep-
resentation into open-market fraud.  They first applied common law
remedies to face-to-face transactions and typically awarded either re-
scissory damages74 based upon the defendant’s gain or out-of-pocket
damages based upon the plaintiff’s loss.75
The out-of-pocket measure, which originated in tort law,76 re-
quires the defendant to compensate for the losses she proximately
ranty of fitness for goods); id. § 8-306(2) (stating that “a person transferring a certified
security to a purchaser for value warrants only that”: (a) the transfer is “effective and right-
ful”; (b) “the security is genuine and has not been materially altered”; and (c) the trans-
feror “knows of no fact which might impair the validity of the security.” (emphasis added)).
72. See, e.g., Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781, 786 (1st Cir. 1965) (noting that “it is sim-
ple equity that a wrongdoer should disgorge his fraudulent enrichment”); see also Thomp-
son, supra note 70, at 353–54 (outlining breach of warranty, misrepresentation, and unjust R
enrichment claims in securities fraud).
73. The distinction between causes of action for deceit and for breach of warranty may
have been caused by the honest confusion of judges.  As Dalley observes, “[i]n Waters v.
Mattingly, 4 Ky. 244, 246 (1808), Judge Edwards clearly understood the difference between
the requirement of warranty and the requirement of sciens, but unfortunately he thought
the distinction arose from the distinction between a suppressio veri and a suggestio falsi . . . .”
Dalley, supra note 66, at 413 n.36. R
74. “Rescissory damages” has been spelled numerous ways over the years.  Thus, cita-
tions throughout this Article may refer to rescissionary, recissory, or recessionary damages.
The same holds true for “rescission,” which has been spelled recision and recission.
75. See Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647, 658–59 (1986) (stating that Congress
chose a rescissory remedy for securities fraud); Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United
States, 406 U.S. 128, 155 (1972) (applying common law damages to a securities fraud case);
Jordan v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., 815 F.2d 429, 441–42 (7th Cir. 1987) (stating that securities
law measures damages in two ways: (1) rescissory damages, which are based on the defend-
ants’ gain; and (2) market damages, which are based on the plaintiffs’ loss); Harris Trust &
Sav. Bank v. Ellis, 810 F.2d 700, 706 (7th Cir. 1987) (“In an action under § 10(b), the
plaintiff cannot take advantage of the recessionary remedies provided elsewhere in the
securities laws. . . .  Sometimes remedies under the securities laws are based on defendants’
gain rather than plaintiffs’ loss, or plaintiff may have an election.” (citations omitted)).
76. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 513–14 (E.D. Pa. 1946), was the first
case to invoke tort principles for an implied right of action under Rule 10b-5.  Judge Kirk-
patrick’s decision in Kardon was “adopted by an ‘overwhelming consensus of the District
Courts and Courts of Appeals.’”  Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 126
S. Ct. 1503, 1509 (2006) (quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723,
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caused.  Thus, this measure only reimburses plaintiffs who were eco-
nomically harmed by the defendant’s misconduct.77  In securities
fraud, out-of-pocket damages compensate plaintiffs for “the difference
between the price paid and the ‘real’ value of the security, i.e., the fair
market value absent the misrepresentations, at the time of the initial
purchase.”78  The “real value,” or “true value” as it is often termed,
means the price absent the fraud.79  Accordingly, courts often deter-
mine whether the investor was a net winner or a net loser from the
fraud.80  Under the out-of-pocket theory, an investor with net mone-
tary gains has no loss and cannot recover.81  Thus, an investor who
730 (1975)).  The Second Circuit later limited the breadth of a Rule 10b-5 private action in
Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 463–64 (2d Cir. 1952).
77. Kaufman, supra note 60, at 129–30. R
78. Robbins v. Koger Props., Inc., 116 F.3d 1441, 1447 n.5 (11th Cir. 1997) (citing
Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 556 (5th Cir. 1981), aff’d in part, rev’d in
part on other grounds, 459 U.S. 375 (1983)); see also Wool v. Tandem Computers Inc., 818
F.2d 1433, 1437 (9th Cir. 1987) (“The out-of-pocket rule fixes recoverable damages as the
difference between the purchase price and the value of the stock at the date of purchase.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Sirota v. Solitron Devices, Inc., 673 F.2d 566, 577 (2d
Cir. 1982) (same); Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175, 189 (3d Cir. 1981) (same);
Green v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 541 F.2d 1335, 1344–46 (9th Cir. 1976) (discussing
out-of-pocket damages); Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 908–09 (9th Cir. 1975) (discuss-
ing out-of-pocket and rescissory damages and stating that, in securities fraud class actions,
the out-of-pocket measure is more common).
79. Randall, 478 U.S. at 661–62; Affiliated Ute Citizens, 406 U.S. at 155; Mathews v. Kid-
der, Peabody & Co., 260 F.3d 239, 249 (3d Cir. 2001); Ambassador Hotel Co. v. Wei-Chuan
Inv., 189 F.3d 1017, 1030 (9th Cir. 1999); Alexander, supra note 2, at 1490–91; Thompson, R
supra note 18, at 1181.  It is the plaintiffs’ burden to provide evidence of the “true value” R
for each date during the class period.  Sowell v. Butcher & Singer, Inc., 926 F.2d 289, 297
(3d Cir. 1991).  Applying the out-of-pocket measure is difficult due to the challenge of
determining the fair market value of the security at a time when the actual market price is
inflated by the defendant’s misrepresentation.  Thompson, supra note 18, at 1181.  Some R
courts have used the value of the stock on a day other than the day that the transaction
occurred, such as when the defendant disclosed the correction. See, e.g., Harris v. Am. Inv.
Co., 523 F.2d 220, 226 (8th Cir. 1975); Richardson v. MacArthur, 451 F.2d 35, 43–44 (10th
Cir. 1971); Esplin v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94, 104–05 (10th Cir. 1968).  However, damages
calculated based on the market price at a later date may inflate the plaintiffs’ damages by
including market changes unrelated to the misrepresentation.  Thompson, supra note 18, R
at 1191.
80. See, e.g., In re Cardinal Health, Inc. Sec. Litig., 226 F.R.D. 298, 308 (S.D. Ohio 2005)
(rejecting “net gainers” as lead plaintiffs); In re Comdisco Sec. Litig., 150 F. Supp. 2d 943,
945–46 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (determining that a pension fund could not serve as lead plaintiff
because the pension fund “derived a net gain of almost $300,000 . . . from its purchases and
sales during the Class Period”); In re McKesson HBOC, Inc. Sec. Litig., 97 F. Supp. 2d 993,
996–97 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (rejecting the net seller as lead plaintiff and observing that a net
purchaser might have more interest in the litigation than a net seller because the net
purchaser was fraudulently induced to purchase shares and was left “holding the bag”
when the fraud was revealed).
81. See, e.g., Arenson v. Broadcom Corp., No. SA CV 02-301GLT, 2004 WL 3253646, at
*2 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 2004) (granting summary judgment against plaintiffs who benefited
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realized more than her initial investment—as in the gold-platinum hy-
pothetical—could not recover.
In face-to-face transactions, courts also awarded common law
remedies based on contract law and equity.  After Judge Aldrich’s
opinion in Janigan v. Taylor,82 the frequency of equitable awards in-
creased.  Judge Aldrich thought disgorgement was appropriate be-
cause it was better “to give the defrauded party the benefit even of
windfalls than to let the fraudulent party keep them.”83  Therefore,
courts reasoned that they should not treat a defendant who commit-
ted fraud any better than a defendant who only breached a contract.84
And so, depending on what justice required, courts began to use ben-
efit-of-the-bargain awards, rescission, and disgorgement as remedies.85
The benefit-of-the-bargain remedy is based in contract law and
compensates plaintiffs for the amount they would have received, in-
cluding profits, if the defendant had performed as promised.86  Dis-
gorgement87 and rescission are also equitable remedies used in
from the alleged price inflation); see also Fox, supra note 14, at 1553 (noting that if the R
price increased, “application of the loss causation rule developed in the context of a tradi-
tional reliance-based action would bar recovery” because it “required that the purchased
security decline in value from what was paid (or was sold at a loss) and that the decline or
loss is in some way reasonably related to the falsity of the statement that induced the
purchase”).
82. 344 F.2d 781 (1st Cir. 1965).
83. Id. at 786; accord Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647, 663 (1986) (citing Judge
Aldrich’s reasoning in Janigan); Rude v. Campbell Square, Inc., 411 F. Supp. 1040, 1050
(D.S.D. 1976) (same).  In Janigan, the defendant, who was president, general manager,
and director of Boston Electro Steel Casting, Inc., purchased stock from his shareholders
without telling them that the corporation was going through a revitalization.  344 F.2d at
783, 785.  After two years, the stock’s value multiplied. Id. at 783.  The court reasoned that
if it awarded the difference between the market price of the stock at the time of the sale
and the price paid to plaintiffs, the damages would have been minimal. Id. at 786.  Instead,
the court rationalized that the fair value of the stock when sold was not the market price,
rather it was the market price of what the stock would have been if the market had the
same information as the defendant. Id.
84. See, e.g., United States v. Ben Grunstein & Sons Co., 137 F. Supp. 197, 209 (D.N.J.
1956) (observing that courts prefer the benefit-of-the-bargain rule over the out-of-pocket
rule because the latter treats willful fraud more leniently than an honest breach); Stout v.
Martin, 104 S.E. 157, 159 (W. Va. 1920) (agreeing with the consensus view that the benefit-
of-the-bargain rule is a better measure of damages in cases of fraud).
85. Ben Grunstein & Sons, 137 F. Supp. at 209–10; Stout, 104 S.E. at 160.  The drafters of
the Restatement of Torts recognized that benefit-of-the-bargain damages were preferable in
fraud actions particularly when the out-of-pocket measure did not afford “just and satisfac-
tory” compensation. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 549 cmt. g (1977).  Courts agreed
with this rationale. E.g., Osofsky v. Zipf, 645 F.2d 107, 114 (2d Cir. 1981); see also KEETON
ET AL., supra note 63, § 110. R
86. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 168 (8th ed. 2004).
87. Disgorgement is “[t]he act of giving up something (such as profits illegally ob-
tained) on demand or by legal compulsion.” Id. at 501.  In this context, disgorgement aims
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contract law.  As applied to face-to-face securities fraud cases, courts
have required defendants to disgorge, or return, their unjust enrich-
ment so that the plaintiff recovers the fraudulently obtained profit.88
Rescissory damages aim to void the fraudulent transaction by restor-
ing the plaintiff to the position she would have occupied absent the
transaction.89  These remedies require that the defendant pay not
only for the fraud but also for the change in market conditions.90  So,
in the process of undoing a securities transaction, the plaintiff avoids
both the harm from the fraud as well as the danger of failing market
conditions.91  Requiring the defendant to bear the risk of market de-
cline distinguishes rescissory damages from out-of-pocket damages,
which seek to isolate the price due to fraud and permit recovery only
to prevent wrongdoers from unjustly enriching themselves, not to compensate victims.
E.g., SEC v. Cavanagh, 445 F.3d 105, 117 (2d Cir. 2006); SEC v. Tome, 833 F.2d 1086, 1096
(2d Cir. 1987); SEC v. Blavin, 760 F.2d 706, 713 (6th Cir. 1985).
88. Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 155 (1972); see also
SEC v. Commonwealth Chem. Sec., Inc., 574 F.2d 90, 102 (2d Cir. 1978) (“Disgorgement
is . . . a method of forcing a defendant to give up the amount by which he was unjustly
enriched.”).  Although these funds are often used to compensate victims of the wrongdo-
ing, the goal of compensation is secondary to that of deterrence. See SEC v. Fischbach
Corp., 133 F.3d 170, 175 (2d Cir. 1997) (“The primary purpose of disgorgement orders is
to deter violations of the securities laws by depriving violators of their ill-gotten gains.”).
89. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 86, at 419.  Merritt Fox has argued that rescis- R
sory damages should be used for securities fraud cases.  Merritt B. Fox, Demystifying Causa-
tion in Fraud-on-the-Market Actions, 60 BUS. LAW. 507, 512–13 (2005).
90. Thompson, supra note 18, at 1182–83.  As Judge Sneed explained, this remedy is R
“rooted in the contract of sale”:
This remedy imposes upon the wrongful seller the burden of any loss in the value
of the stock between the date of sale and the disclosure date.  This is appropriate
because the wrongful seller as a direct consequence of his wrong shifted to the
purchaser the risks which he would have borne but for the wrongful sale.  The
seller’s obligation to accept the return of the risk he wrongfully shifted is rooted
in the contract of sale.  That is, it springs from his contractual undertaking.
Green v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 541 F.2d 1335, 1343 (9th Cir. 1976) (Sneed, J.,
concurring).
91. Thompson, supra note 18, at 1182.  Some courts have even applied a rescissory R
measure for open-market situations. See, e.g., United States v. Grabske, 260 F. Supp. 2d
866, 873 (N.D. Cal. 2002).  The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit pondered how to
apply rescissionary damages as follows:
Assuming a sale and purchase of stock, true rescission would involve a return, on
the one hand, of the purchase price and, on the other hand, of the stock pur-
chased.  In an open market setting the injured party “returns the stock” by selling
it on the open market.  The defendant “returns the purchase price” by compen-
sating the injured party for any difference between the price that the injured
party paid for the security and its trading price following the disclosure of the
fraud.
In re Mego Fin. Corp. Sec. Litig., 213 F.3d 454, 460 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted).  Given the nature of the loss causation requirement after Dura,
it stands to reason that private plaintiffs should no longer be permitted to recover rescis-
sory damages. See infra Part IV.A.1.
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for that difference.92  Although this rationale makes sense as applied
to face-to-face transactions where the plaintiff sells stock that skyrock-
ets in value after the sale and the defendant acquires the stock by
fraud, it does not hold true for secondary open-market transactions.93
3. Remedies for Fraud-on-the-Market
As discussed above, in face-to-face transactions, the wrongdoer’s
obligation to accept the returned risk of failing market conditions is
founded in the sale contract.94  In the open-market situation, on the
other hand, the corporate defendant does not sell anything directly to
the plaintiff.95  Instead, the plaintiff purchases stock from others on
the open market and the corporate defendant’s misrepresentations
do not shift the risk of loss.96  The rationale is that the corporation
cannot return a purchase price it never received.97
92. See Beare v. Wright, 103 N.W. 632, 634 (N.D. 1905) (finding that the plaintiff who
elected to affirm the contract after learning of fraud was entitled only to out-of-pocket
damages); Doyle v. Union Bank & Trust Co., 59 P.2d 1171, 1175 (Mont. 1936) (finding
that a plaintiff was not entitled to out-of-pocket damages where she was unable to distin-
guish the actual value of the bond at the time of sale); Poole v. Camden, 92 S.E. 454, 458
(W. Va. 1916) (awarding recissory damages to plaintiff fraudulently induced to sell stock at
below market value); Thompson, supra note 18, at 1182–83. R
93. See Kaufman, supra note 60, at 43–44.  Accordingly, a growing number of courts R
refuse to award rescissionary damages in section 10(b) cases. See, e.g., Mathews v. Kidder,
Peabody & Co., 260 F.3d 239, 250 (3d Cir. 2001) (“[I]n most § 10(b) cases, we are ex-
tremely hesitant to award rescissionary damages and instead apply an ‘out of pocket mea-
sure.’”); Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 903 F.2d 186, 203 n.25 (3d Cir. 1990)
(“Although the Supreme Court has reserved the question whether a rescissionary measure
of damages is ever appropriate for defrauded buyers under rule 10b-5, this court has ex-
pressed clear disapproval of a damage theory that would insure defrauded buyers against
downside market risk unrelated to the fraud . . . .” (citation omitted)); Huddleston v.
Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 555 (5th Cir. 1981) (“[T]he rescissional measure is
unjust insofar as it compensates an investor for the nonspecific risks which he assumes by
entering the market.  Losses thus accruing have no relation to either the benefits derived
by the defendants from the fraud or to the blameworthiness of their conduct.” (citations
omitted)), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 459 U.S. 375 (1983).
94. See supra note 90 and accompanying text. R
95. Green, 541 F.2d at 1343 (Sneed, J., concurring); see also Fox, supra note 14, at 1548 R
(“Fraud-on-the-market actions such as Dura are very different from traditional reliance-
based actions.  The plaintiff in a traditional reliance-based action is typically a purchaser
involved in either a face-to-face transaction in shares of a non-publicly traded issuer or an
IPO.”).
96. Green, 541 F.2d at 1343 (Sneed, J., concurring); see also Alexander, supra note 2, at R
1496 (noting that the transactions underlying securities class actions take place in an open
market); Thompson, supra note 70, at 386 (“Risks of change in the market that occur R
within a reasonable time following the discovery of the fraud shift to the defendants, while
risks of market changes after that time fall on the plaintiff.”).
97. Green, 541 F.2d at 1343 (Sneed, J., concurring).  Courts and commentators alike
have commented on an interesting anomaly in open-market securities fraud cases: because
every purchase has a corresponding sale, for every market participant damaged by the
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Furthermore, through enterprise liability, it is the diversified
shareholders who must bear the cost of the fraud even though they
are not responsible for the fraud.98  Put another way, plaintiffs gener-
ally bring Rule 10b-5 fraud-on-the-market actions against non-issuing
parties (the corporations); thus, there is no sale contract or privity
between the plaintiff and defendant.99  When there is no direct trans-
action or contract between the plaintiff-investor and the corporate de-
fendant (and thus no privity), it makes little sense to award contract-
based damages.100  Consequently, rescissory damages cannot be justi-
fied on a restitution theory.101
The justification for disgorgement is likewise misplaced.  Dis-
gorgement assumes that the fraud unjustly enriched the defendant.102
fraud there is another participant who benefited. E.g., In re Clearly Canadian Sec. Litig.,
875 F. Supp. 1410, 1415 n.3 (N.D. Cal. 1995); Alexander, supra note 2, at 1496; Easter- R
brook & Fischel, supra note 3, at 635. R
98. Arlen & Carney, supra note 4, at 699–700. R
99. Ross v. Bank S., N.A., 885 F.2d 723, 742 (11th Cir. 1989) (Tjoflat, J., specially con-
curring); In re Letterman Bros. Energy Sec. Litig., 799 F.2d 967, 972 (5th Cir. 1986); see also
Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 554 (5th Cir. 1981) (“Use of the rescis-
sional measure is usually limited to cases involving either privity between plaintiff and de-
fendant or some specific fiduciary duty owed by brokers to their customers.”), aff’d in part,
rev’d in part on other grounds, 459 U.S. 375 (1983); Philip J. Leas, Note, The Measure of Dam-
ages in Rule 10b-5 Cases Involving Actively Traded Securities, 26 STAN. L. REV. 371, 376–77
(1974) (same).
100. Ross, 885 F.2d at 742 (Tjoflat, J., specially concurring) (explaining that rescission is
an inappropriate remedy in a Rule 10b-5 action against non-issuing parties).  Judge Tjoflat
offered the following thoughts as to why rescission is inappropriate:
Rescission is an equitable remedy that restores parties to a transaction to their
status quo ante.  Typically, a buyer discovers a seller’s fraud, promptly tenders the
goods to the seller, and demands the return of his purchase price.  The court
then orders the seller to return the purchase price and uses its civil contempt
power to coerce the seller’s compliance with its order.  This remedy is available,
however, only against parties to a contract—a court may not order rescission in a
buyer’s action against a defrauding party who is not a party to the contract of sale.
Thus, in the context of Rule 10b-5, where buyers often sue parties that are not in
privity of contract with the buyer, rescission is unavailable.
Id. (citations omitted); see also Huddleston, 640 F.2d at 554–55 (noting the inherent difficul-
ties in applying rescissory damages absent privity or some special relationship between the
parties); Thompson, supra note 18, at 1185 (“In open market transactions when the de- R
fendants have made misleading statements to the market, the plaintiffs trade not with the
defendants but with strangers in the market.  These alternative remedies are not likely to
be available in that setting.”); Leas, supra note 99, at 376–77 (arguing that rescissory dam- R
ages should not apply to fraud-on-the-market actions because such damages are likely dis-
proportionate to an individual defendant’s moral culpability).
101. Green, 541 F.2d at 1343.
102. Disgorgement plays an important deterrence role in face-to-face transactions, as
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit explained in SEC v. Gemstar-TV Guide Interna-
tional, Inc., 401 F.3d 1031, 1047 (9th Cir. 2005), but it does not translate well into open-
market transactions.  Disgorgement is generally paid to victims of wrongdoing only when
the victims can establish an equitable claim to the funds.  SEC v. Drexel Burnham Lambert,
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But, in the open market, the plaintiff does not exchange money di-
rectly with the corporation and the corporation does not benefit di-
rectly from that profit.103  Thus, there is no direct unjust enrichment
to disgorge.104
This is not to say that corporations never receive indirect benefits
from undiscovered open-market fraud.105  Indeed, depending upon
the type of fraud, the corporation might receive incidental tax bene-
fits, lower costs of capital, protection from hostile takeovers, tempo-
rary business advantages, and increased publicity, while its employees
may experience increased job security.  In the short run, the corpora-
tion’s increased share price may provide the capital to enter new busi-
nesses and update capital assets.106  The agent committing fraud may
temporarily benefit from higher firm share prices, job advancement,
increased stock options, and increased prestige and reputation.107  Yet
all of these purported benefits are speculative and nearly impossible
Inc., 956 F. Supp. 503, 507 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).  When the proceeds of disgorgement do not
go to the victims, the money should be paid into the United States Treasury. Id.; see also
SEC v. Fischbach Corp., 133 F.3d 170, 177 (2d Cir. 1997) (affirming district court’s deci-
sion to pay disgorged funds into the Treasury); Drexel Burnham Lambert, 956 F. Supp. at 508
(directing payment of disgorged funds into the Treasury where there was no equitable
claim).
103. See Pritchard, supra note 24, at 930–37 (proposing that even though corporations R
do not receive any pecuniary benefit from the fraud, their agents may be motivated by fear,
greed, and Pollyannaism).
104. Indeed, one commentator suggested that investors and their attorneys are the ones
unjustly enriched by the fraud, not the corporation.  Langevoort, supra note 21, at 651.  As R
I explain below, because the corporation does receive some indirect benefits from the
initial undiscovered fraud, I would not go that far.  The class action may deter fraud where
the SEC, exchanges, and Department of Justice lack either the interest or the resources to
do so.
105. In an auditor situation, Judge Posner noted that to assume the corporation always
benefits from the fraud ignores the distinction between “[f]raud on behalf of a corpora-
tion” and “fraud against it.”  Cenco Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman, 686 F.2d 449, 456 (7th Cir.
1982).  “Fraud against the corporation usually hurts just the corporation; the stockholders
are the principal if not only victims . . . .” Id.  Defendants have attempted to employ this
distinction in securities fraud cases by arguing that where the corporation received no
benefit it should not be held liable.  This argument, however, has been rejected by at least
one court. E.g., In re Cylink Sec. Litig., 178 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1087–88 (N.D. Cal. 2001).
106. These benefits could continue to provide increased revenues long after the litiga-
tion ends.  Yet, even if a court required a corporation to disgorge its unjust enrichment,
§ 78bb(a)’s “actual damages” requirement may limit the extent to which one could specu-
late about the fruits of fraud. See infra Part IV.A.2.
107. See, e.g., Plevy v. Haggerty, 38 F. Supp. 2d 816, 833 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (listing the
possible benefits a corporate agent may receive by committing fraud); Alexander, supra
note 2, at 1498 (same); Arlen & Carney, supra note 4, at 702–03 (same); see also Coffee, R
supra note 4, at 39 (“Typically, managers hide bad news because they fear loss of their jobs R
(either from a dismissal or a hostile takeover), and they overstate favorable developments
or inflate earnings in order to maximize the value of their stock options and other equity
compensation.”).
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to value.  Even assuming a court could value them, their value is prob-
ably a good deal less than the losses of open-market purchasers.108
Consequently, if the corporation has to compensate class members for
out-of-pocket losses, this compensation would also purge the corpora-
tion of any indirect benefits.  One court observed that misstatements
seldom benefit the corporate issuer and that “chickens have a way of
coming home to roost.”109  “When they do so in the form of securities
class action plaintiffs, a corporation has hell (and usually a great deal
of money) to pay.”110  In sum, even if the corporation did receive
some incidental benefit from the initial undiscovered fraud, an out-of-
pocket remedy will likely suffice.
Even though Dura indicated that modern securities actions re-
semble common law deceit and misrepresentation actions, when craft-
ing remedies, courts should not ignore either the absence of a
contract or the other disparities between face-to-face and open-market
transactions.  Common law permitted disgorgement and recovery of
benefit-of-the-bargain damages based on contract law and unjust en-
richment principles.  But these principles do not apply to open-
market fraud because, apart from public offerings, the issuer is gener-
ally not the seller in a fraud-on-the-market case.111
III. NORMATIVE THEORIES SUPPORTING PRIVATE RULE 10B-5 ACTIONS
Compensating the plaintiff class for more than its out-of-pocket
loss in the gold-platinum hypothetical, for example, is problematic
given the distinctions between common law deceit and misrepresenta-
tion actions on the one hand and fraud-on-the-market actions on the
other.112  But if compensating investors for more than their out-of-
pocket losses fostered the goals of private class action litigation, then
108. Alexander, supra note 2, at 1498. R
109. In re Cylink, 178 F. Supp. 2d at 1087.
110. Id. at 1087–88.  The judge’s main concern was not whether corporations should be
held vicariously liable for the acts of their agents when their agents do not act in concert
with or for the benefit of the corporation.  Instead, the judge was troubled that “[t]aking
the corporation out of the class action for want of allegations of corporate benefit might
well endanger the[ ] sources of recovery.” Id. at 1088.
111. Some commentators have gone further to argue that investors are not entitled to
recover out-of-pocket losses. See, e.g., Langevoort, supra note 21, at 646 (arguing that “full R
out-of-pocket compensation in open-market cases is systematically excessive and dysfunc-
tional, and not a system that a rational investor considering the issue ex ante would want,
much less demand”).
112. See Coffee, Loss Causation, supra note 6, at 1 (“[C]ourts should interpret loss causa- R
tion to require a net stock market decline in the security’s price in order to preclude what I
termed ‘phantom losses.’  But the Court has not done that.  Indeed, it has even suggested
that new forms of phantom losses may be recoverable.”).
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\66-2\MLR202.txt unknown Seq: 24 12-FEB-07 15:33
2007] REASSESSING DAMAGES IN SECURITIES FRAUD CLASS ACTIONS 371
proposing legislative and judicial reforms to facilitate greater recovery
might be a worthwhile endeavor.  The corrective justice theory posits
that “[i]njustice occurs when . . . one party realizes a gain and the
other a corresponding loss.”113  Theoretically, the class action then
corrects the injustice by depriving one party’s gain and restoring it to
the parties with the loss.114  However, because corporations do not
receive a direct gain from the agent’s fraud on the open market, it is
implausible to contend that the principal function of the class action
is to correct justice by restoring lost compensation to investors.115
A. Compensation as a Theoretical Rationale for Private Class Actions
Perhaps ideally, the private securities class action would provide
an efficient means for obtaining financial relief for the wronged inves-
tor.  Still, when the subject security’s value appreciates after fraud
(generating a value higher than what the investor paid for the secur-
ity), as in the gold-platinum hypothetical, the investor is already finan-
cially advantaged from owning the security.116  Even absent this
windfall, statistics show that securities class action settlements recover
113. Ernest J. Weinrib, Corrective Justice in a Nutshell, 52 U. TORONTO L.J. 349, 349 (2002);
see also Gary T. Schwartz, Mixed Theories of Tort Law: Affirming Both Deterrence and Corrective
Justice, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1801, 1823 (1997) (noting corrective justice’s concern for compen-
sating victims).
114. Weinrib, supra note 113, at 349.  Weinrib observes: R
A correlatively structured remedy responds to and undoes an injustice only if that
injustice is itself correlatively structured.  In bringing an action against the defen-
dant, the plaintiff is asserting that the two are connected as doer and sufferer of
the same injustice. . . .  The law then rectifies this injustice by reversing its active
and passive poles, so that the doer of injustice becomes the sufferer of the law’s
remedy.
Id. at 350.  Although this rationale readily applies to face-to-face transactions, it is problem-
atic as applied to open-market transactions for the same reasons that rescission and dis-
gorgement are problematic.  In this sense, the securities fraud class action is likely more in
line with the notion of distributive justice. See id. at 351 (stating that distributive justice
involves the sharing of a benefit or burden by linking parties through the benefit or bur-
den they share).  I would be remiss in failing to point out that a wide divide exists between
corrective justice scholars and utilitarian scholars. See, e.g., Jeffrey O’Connell & Christo-
pher J. Robinette, The Role of Compensation in Personal Injury Tort Law: A Response to the
Opposite Concerns of Gary Schwartz and Patrick Atiyah, 32 CONN. L. REV. 137, 139 (1999) (not-
ing that “[u]tilitarian scholars and corrective justice scholars rarely acknowledge the value
of opposing theories and frequently deride them”).
115. See Schwartz, supra note 113, at 1824 (“For the fundamental rule of vicarious liabil- R
ity, the deterrence rationale gets the job done in a way that corrective justice does not.”).
116. Merritt Fox adopts the opposite view and thinks that the plaintiff has suffered a loss
in some sense of the word.  He observes:
Assuming that she does not sell before full market realization of the true situa-
tion, the defendant’s misstatement has made her worse off in an amount equal to
its inflation of purchase price.  But for the misstatement, she would have paid
exactly that much less for the share, yet her return over her period of ownership
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only a small amount of investor loss,117 and, of financial institutions
with claims in settled securities class actions, around seventy percent
do not even submit them.118  One study estimated that institutional
investors failed to collect approximately $1 billion a year from securi-
ties class action settlements.119  Statistics indicating that institutional
investors are indifferent to settlement funds weakens the corrective
justice argument in favor of private class actions, especially where in-
vestors experienced no net loss from bundled favorable and adverse
information.
Despite the evidence, compensation is often thought to be a rea-
son to permit fraud-on-the-market actions by private plaintiffs.120
Therefore, this Section analyzes theories that undermine the compen-
sation argument, and it observes that (1) Congress did not enact se-
curities laws to provide investor insurance; (2) private securities class
actions redistribute wealth among diversified shareholders; and (3)
compensating investors for their cognitive errors reduces incentives to
learn and creates perverse incentives to hold on to stocks that hint at
fraud.  Even though these observations could apply to securities class
actions as a whole, my focus here is that the class action’s principal
(however long, and from whatever mix of dividends, distributions and sales pro-
ceeds that she receives) would have been just as great.
Fox, supra note 14, at 1553.  Oddly, the U.S. government also took the position that this R
constitutes a loss.  Specifically, it indicated that a price decline “may not be a necessary
condition for loss causation, however, because the inflation attributable to fraud could be
reduced or eliminated even if there were a net increase in price.”  Brief for the United
States as Amicus Curiae at 13, Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 (2005) (No. 03-
932).
117. Investor losses continually exceed settlement values. RONALD I. MILLER ET AL.,
NERA ECON. CONSULTING, RECENT TRENDS IN SHAREHOLDER CLASS ACTION LITIGATION: BE-
YOND THE MEGA-SETTLEMENTS, IS STABILIZATION AHEAD?, 7 (2006).
118. Investor Protection: A Review of Plaintiffs’ Attorney Abuses in Securities Litigation and Legis-
lative Remedies: Hearing on H.R. 5491 Before the Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Insurance, and
Government Sponsored Enterprises, 109th Cong. 6 (2006) (testimony of Professor James D.
Cox, Duke University School of Law); James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Letting Billions
Slip Through Your Fingers: Empirical Evidence and Legal Implications of the Failure of Financial
Institutions to Participate in Securities Class Action Settlements, 58 STAN. L. REV. 411, 412 (2005)
[hereinafter Cox & Thomas, Letting Billions Slip Through Your Fingers]; James D. Cox &
Randall S. Thomas, Leaving Money on the Table: Do Institutional Investors Fail to File Claims in
Securities Class Actions?, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 855, 870 (2002) [hereinafter Cox & Thomas,
Leaving Money on the Table].
119. Cox & Thomas, Letting Billions Slip Through Your Fingers, supra note 118, at 412; A.C. R
Pritchard, Who Cares?, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 883, 883 (2002).
120. Section 28(a) of the Securities Exchange Act contributed to this idea of compensa-
tion, and courts, without difficulty, accepted that damages developed for common law
fraud face-to-face transactions also applied to open-market transactions.  Langevoort, supra
note 21, at 645. R
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purpose should not be to compensate investors when they suffered no
out-of-pocket losses.
1. Securities Laws Were Not Enacted to Provide Investor Insurance
Congress enacted securities laws to promote integrity in the open
market, not to provide investor insurance.121  In fact, the loss causa-
tion element precludes securities laws from becoming an insurance
program for any security purchased in reliance on a misstatement—
regardless of whether the misstatement caused a change in value—by
ensuring that the misdeed actually caused the economic loss.122
To be sure, failing to disclose material information that artificially
inflates a security’s price harms an investor who purchases at that
price and does not sell the security before the corporation discloses
adverse information.  Nevertheless, investing in the stock market is an
inherently risky business, and the corporate defendant cannot return
the illicit profit because the seller—not the corporation—received it.
In short, stock market investments should not be treated as the
equivalent of placing money in a risk-free federally insured savings
and loan plan.123  This is not to say that fraud should become another
investment risk.  Rather, when misstatements do not cause the loss, or
the market simply is not as strong as predicted, the class action should
not function as a form of supplemental income.  To minimize risk,
investors can insulate themselves from the effects of market down-
121. Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 347–48 (2005) (“[A]llowing a plaintiff
to forgo giving any indication of the economic loss and proximate cause . . . would bring
about harm of the very sort the statutes seek to avoid. . . .  Such a rule would tend to
transform a private securities action into a partial downside insurance policy.” (citations
omitted)); Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 252 (1988) (White, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (noting that there is no support for treating securities laws as “a
scheme of investor’s insurance”); H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 31 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), as
reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 730 (stating that the purpose of securities laws is to
maintain confidence in the securities markets); see also Donald C. Langevoort, Taming the
Animal Spirits of the Stock Markets: A Behavioral Approach to Securities Regulation, 97 NW. U. L.
REV. 135, 181 (2002) (“[T]here is very little reason to use the class action device as what is
essentially an insurance system against market mood swings.”).
122. Carlton v. Franklin, Nos. 89-2942 & 89-2972 to 89-2974, 1990 WL 116788, at *3 (4th
Cir. Aug. 2, 1990).
123. See generally Bridgen v. Scott, 456 F. Supp. 1048, 1058 (S.D. Tex. 1978) (likening
plaintiffs who invested in speculative real estate investments, received tax write-offs and
benefits from the deal, and wanted rescission to roulette players).  There have been a num-
ber of arguments that the gambling industry and securities industry should have similar
regulation. E.g., Thomas Lee Hazen, Disparate Regulatory Schemes for Parallel Activities: Securi-
ties Regulation, Derivatives Regulation, Gambling, and Insurance, 24 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN.
L. 375, 395 (2005).
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turns and fraud by diversifying their portfolios.124  Thus, as set forth
below, compensating investors for company-specific losses may not be
necessary.
2. Private Actions Redistribute Wealth Among Diversified
Shareholders
It is often said that securities class actions are a zero-sum game for
diversified investors, and I will not attempt to rehash that literature
here.125  I will, however, note that class actions cannot actually be a
zero-sum game when as much as thirty percent of the recovery pays
for litigation costs.126  To explain, in open-market class litigation, a
group of shareholders and former shareholders who purchased the
defendant corporation’s stock during the relevant class period sues
the corporation for a misstatement or omission even though the cor-
poration itself has not purchased or sold its securities.  When the liti-
gation settles (or a judgment is entered), the corporation and thus,
indirectly, its shareholders, bear the costs.127  Accordingly, securities
class actions in the open market produce a wealth transfer between
shareholders who own stock in the corporation and shareholders in
the class.128
This is particularly true when an investor spreads the risk of loss
by diversifying her portfolio, and thereby minimizes the impact of a
poor financial showing by any one company.129  Diversification in-
124. See Pritchard, supra note 24, at 940 (“Holding a diversified portfolio effectively elim- R
inates any possibility of being a net loser from fraud on the market, thereby assuaging the
concerns of even the risk-averse shareholder.”).
125. Donald Langevoort explains the zero-sum game analysis as follows:
First, any award against the issuer or settlement is funded directly or indirectly out
of the issuer shareholders’ pockets, as the fraud-on-the-market litigation system is
premised almost exclusively on a system of vicarious liability.  Second, investors
tend to be, directly or indirectly, diversified in their investments and are just as
likely to gain a windfall from issuer “fraud-on-the-market” as to end up a loser.
Langevoort, supra note 21, at 181 (citation omitted); see also Alexander, supra note 2, at R
1502 (discussing the effects of diversification in securities class actions); Coffee, supra note
4, at 33 (same); Pritchard, supra note 24, at 939 (“In fraud on the market, for every share- R
holder who bought at a fraudulently inflated price, another shareholder has sold: The
buyer’s individual loss is offset by the seller’s gain.”); Douglas M. Schwab et al., A Completely
New Approach to Rule 10b-5 Damages, in FINANCIAL FRAUD IN PUBLIC COMPANIES: PREVENTION,
DETECTION & LITIGATION, at 347, 364–65 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice, Course Handbook
Series No. B0-00O2, 2000).
126. ANJAN V. THAKOR ET AL., INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, THE ECONOMIC REALITY OF SE-
CURITIES CLASS ACTION LITIGATION 2 (2005), http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/
pdfs/EconomicRealityNavigant.pdf.
127. Coffee, supra note 4, at 32. R
128. Id. at 32–33.
129. Pritchard, supra note 24, at 940; Coffee, supra note 4, at 33. R
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creases the likelihood that an investor will be both in the plaintiff class
suing the corporation and in the shareholder group paying for the
litigation.130  The more an investor is diversified, the greater the likeli-
hood that, on any given day, she will be a shareholder within the class
period or in the group indirectly funding the settlement.  Conse-
quently, even though investors “win” on some days and “lose” on
others, in the aggregate, they are transferring wealth from one pocket
to another.131  In sum, private securities class actions appear to be a
costly means for diversified investors to make wealth transfers to them-
selves (and pay a substantial amount to their attorneys).132
In fact, the primary immediate beneficiaries of private securities
fraud class actions appear to be the attorneys.133  Transactional costs
such as attorneys’ fees and settlement payments to investors frequently
fall upon the corporation’s shareholders—often inequitably since the
shareholders engaged in no wrongdoing.  Even the SEC recently indi-
cated that it will consider whether the violative conduct victimized
shareholders when determining whether to impose hefty financial
penalties on the corporation.134  As Professor John Coffee argues,
130. Coffee, supra note 4, at 33.  For example, say an investor focuses on the pharmaceu- R
tical industry and compiles a diversified portfolio of stocks for the numerous companies
within that industry.  If consumers avoid Merck’s painkiller, Vioxx, because of the ongoing
class litigation, it does not mean that they will go without painkillers and cause a downturn
in the entire pharmaceutical industry.  Rather, they will use a different painkiller.  An in-
vestor with diversified stocks within the pharmaceutical industry may suffer loss from the
decrease in Merck’s stock but a gain from the increase in sales from other companies’
painkillers.  Thus, there is no net loss.
131. Id.  For each shareholder who bought the stock at an artificially inflated price due
to fraud, another shareholder has sold.  Alexander, supra note 2, at 1496.  Thus, one partic- R
ular buyer’s loss is offset by the seller’s gain.  If all investors are ignorant of the fraud and
are diversified, then there will be winners with windfalls just as often as there are losers.
Academics have continued to debate the effects of this circularity. See, e.g., Arlen & Carney,
supra note 4, at 698–700 (suggesting that the loss falls on individuals who were sharehold- R
ers when the fraud is revealed); Paul G. Mahoney, Precaution Costs and the Law of Fraud in
Impersonal Markets, 78 VA. L. REV. 623, 635 (1992) (arguing that the circularity undermines
Rule 10b-5’s effectiveness as a fraud deterrent).
132. Arlen & Carney, supra note 4, at 700; Coffee, supra note 4, at 33. R
133. Arlen & Carney, supra note 4, at 700; Richard M. Phillips & Gilbert C. Miller, The R
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995: Rebalancing Litigation Risks and Rewards for Class
Action Plaintiffs, Defendants and Attorneys, 51 BUS. LAW. 1009, 1013 (1996); cf. Jonathan R.
Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class Action and Derivative Litiga-
tion: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 12 (1991) (ob-
serving that plaintiffs’ attorneys may have divergent interests from the interests of the
class).  Of course, the economy as a whole may benefit from increased deterrence of fraud.
134. Press Release, SEC, Statement of the Sec. & Exch. Comm’n Concerning Fin. Penal-
ties (Jan. 4, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006-4.htm.  The SEC
observed:
In cases in which shareholders are the principal victims of the violations, the
Committee expects that the SEC, when appropriate, will seek penalties from the
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“[t]o punish the corporation and its shareholders in [a typical secon-
dary open-market case] is much like seeking to deter burglary by im-
posing penalties on the victim for having suffered a burglary.”135  If
measured only by investor trading gains and losses, the resulting net
social gain is zero.136
3. Permitting Recovery Beyond Out-of-Pocket Losses Reduces Incentives
to Learn
Securities class actions not only operate as a costly means for
wealth redistribution, they may also have perverse incentives on inves-
tor motivation and education.137  Behavioral finance theorists present
some tentative answers to market phenomenon left unexplained by
traditional law and economics.138  They refute the assumption that in-
vestors are rational,139 but analysts have yet to relate these theories to
individual offenders acting for a corporate issuer.  Moreover, in deciding whether
and to what extent to assess a penalty against the issuer, the court may properly
take into account whether civil penalties assessed against corporate issuers will
ultimately be paid by shareholders who were themselves victimized by the viola-
tions.  The court also may consider the extent to which the passage of time has
resulted in shareholder turnover.
Id.
135. Coffee, supra note 4, at 6. R
136. Alexander, supra note 2, at 1496; Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 3, at 639; R
Langevoort, supra note 21, at 646. R
137. As Langevoort notes, “[f]ew rational investors would opt for a system that so system-
atically overcompensates when they know that investors generally will be funding those
payments.  And no rational investor would opt for an expensive litigation system to accom-
plish it.”  Langevoort, supra note 21, at 650. R
138. Langevoort, supra note 121, at 153.  For background on the literature of behavioral R
finance, see BEHAVIORAL LAW & ECONOMICS (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000); HERSH SHEFRIN,
BEYOND GREED AND FEAR: UNDERSTANDING BEHAVIORAL FINANCE AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
INVESTING 13–22 (2002); Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the SEC,
56 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2003); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market
Efficiency Twenty Years Later: The Hindsight Bias, 28 J. CORP. L. 715 (2003); Christine Jolls et
al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998); Jonathan
Klick & Gregory Mitchell, Governmental Regulation of Irrationality: Moral and Cognitive
Hazards, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1620 (2006); Langevoort, supra note 121; Robert Prentice, R
Whither Securities Regulation? Some Behavioral Observations Regarding Proposals for Its Future, 51
DUKE L.J. 1397 (2002).
139. Ribstein, supra note 6, at 138; Philip E. Tetlock & Barbara A. Mellers, The Great R
Rationality Debate, 13 PSYCHOL. SCI. 94, 94 (2002).  Numerous works explicate the particular
biases to which investors might be subject. See, e.g., Choi & Pritchard, supra note 138, at R
7–14 (overconfidence bias, reliance on heuristics, and cognitive dissonance); Baruch
Fischhoff, Hindsight ? Foresight: The Effect of Outcome Knowledge on Judgment Under Uncertainty,
1 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL: HUM. PERCEPTION & PERFORMANCE 288 (1975) (hindsight
bias); Dale Griffin & Amos Tversky, The Weighing of Evidence and the Determinants of Confi-
dence, 24 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 411 (1992) (overconfidence bias); Amos Tversky & Daniel
Kahneman, Belief in the Law of Small Numbers, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS
AND BIASES 23 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982).
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securities regulation.140  As Larry Ribstein observed, if markets are not
as efficient as we formerly believed, then Congress may need to
strengthen securities laws to provide additional insulation from inves-
tor misjudgment—i.e., the paternalistic view of behavioral econom-
ics.141  On the other hand, if “noise” moves markets instead of actual
information, then increased regulation and liability may lead to more
harm.142  Ribstein identifies one of the hazards related to class actions
and notes that “[f]orcing corporations or insiders to pay damages
linked to the market’s irrational response to disclosures may have per-
verse effects, including discouraging disclosure.”143
But discouraging disclosure may be even less problematic than
diminishing individual incentives to learn from past investment mis-
haps.  Jonathan Klick and Greg Mitchell’s recent research indicates
that making the private class action available to defrauded investors
even where the investors experienced no out-of-pocket loss could re-
duce both their incentive to learn and their ability to make future
decisions.144  Klick and Mitchell argue that “moral hazards” appear
when paternalistic regulations—such as securities laws—reduce indi-
vidual incentives to act “deliberately and carefully.”145  Similarly, indi-
viduals face “cognitive hazards” when these regulations restrict
choices that might otherwise function as learning opportunities.146
But moral and cognitive hazards do not exist solely in the vacuum of
regulation.  Plaintiffs’ attorneys’ intervention into investors’ lives may
also restrict learning opportunities.
As we have seen, diversified investors, as corporate shareholders,
indirectly fund a generous portion of securities fraud settlements.147
140. Langevoort, supra note 121, at 152 (“Lawyers and policy makers cannot hope to R
resolve the academic dispute over market efficiency . . . .”); Ribstein, supra note 6, at 138. R
141. Ribstein, supra note 6, at 138. R
142. Id.; see generally J. Bradford De Long et al., Noise Trader Risk in Financial Markets, 98 J.
POL. ECON. 703 (1990) (analyzing the effects of noise traders on the market).
143. Ribstein, supra note 6, at 138.  Ribstein further observes that holding corporate R
agents liable for misrepresentations may “increase investors’ tendency toward overconfi-
dence by convincing them that securities trading is safe, even if liability merely protects
them only from a relatively narrow risk of misrepresentation.” Id. at 144.
144. See Klick & Mitchell, supra note 138, at 1626. R
145. Id.; see also Ribstein, supra note 6, at 145 (arguing that increased securities regula- R
tions lessens investors’ abilities to protect themselves).
146. See Klick & Mitchell, supra note 138, at 1626, 1647–49.  Ribstein observes that the R
law may not have much effect on learning if investors do not know how it protects them,
and he points out that investors who do learn may be replaced by a new naı¨ve group.
Ribstein supra note 6, at 145.  Yet, this does not eliminate the potential perverse effects of R
class litigation on investor learning.
147. See supra notes 129–132 and accompanying text; see also Pritchard, supra note 24, at R
957–58 (“The transaction costs of litigation leading to settlements that merely transfer
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Few fully informed investors would choose expensive class litigation
that essentially transfers wealth from one pocket to another.148  Yet
behavioral finance indicates that human rationality is bounded and
that decisionmakers must select among numerous demands for their
time and attention.149  Consequently, investors are “rational[ly]
ignoran[t],” possibly about the true litigation costs, because it is un-
reasonable, if not impossible, to gather all relevant information before
making a single decision.150  Because the majority of non-attorney in-
dividuals do not have much information about the inner-workings of a
securities fraud class action, they are (1) likely to take their attorneys’
advice and proceed with a class action (and subsequent settlement)
that they are inadvertently funding, and (2) not likely to distinguish
between recoveries that are out-of-pocket versus those based on con-
tract law measurements, such as disgorgement or rescissory dam-
ages.151  Although legal education would likely diminish this
ignorance,152 it is extraordinarily unlikely that an investor would
squander the time, effort, and expense of a legal education just to
determine whether a securities class action makes economic sense.
Without doctrinal consensus on a securities fraud remedy, the
class action is arguably available to investors, such as those in the gold-
platinum hypothetical, who did not experience a net loss.  Because
wealth among shareholders are a pure social waste, unless class actions provide a substan-
tial deterrent effect.”).
148. Langevoort, supra note 21, at 650. R
149. See Herbert A. Simon, Rational Choice and the Structure of the Environment, 63
PSYCHOL. REV. 129, 129 (1956) (arguing that economic theorists overestimate human deci-
sionmaking abilities); see also ROBYN M. DAWES, RATIONAL CHOICE IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD
50–56 (1988) (explaining Simon’s theory of bounded rationality); Jolls et al., supra note
138, at 1477 (explaining that bounded rationality refers to limitations in human cogni- R
tion); Prentice, supra note 138, at 1454–55 (noting that bounded rationality means deci- R
sionmakers must make choices based on incomplete and inaccurate information).
150. Prentice, supra note 138, at 1454–55.  There have been a number of initiatives to R
make corporate disclosures less dense and more useful through simplification.  For exam-
ple, before Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, SEC Chairman Pitt urged public com-
panies to “consider simplifying financial disclosures to make accounting statements useful
to, and utilizable by, ordinary investors.”  Harvey L. Pitt, Chairman, SEC, Remarks Before
the AICPA (American Institute of Certified Public Accountants) Governing Council (Oct.
22, 2001), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch516.htm. Making financial
disclosures easier to read would certainly help in reducing the amount of information that
investors might consider before investing.  Yet, even still, it would be difficult to read every
company’s full disclosures before making a single investment decision.
151. See Ribstein, supra note 6, at 141 (“[I]nvestors are not equal in education, intelli- R
gence, or expertise.”).
152. See Klick & Mitchell, supra note 138, at 1652 (suggesting that education affects the R
likelihood of an individual picking the correct option).
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individuals “learn[ ] by doing,”153 compensating investors without out-
of-pocket losses not only prevents them from learning from their past
investment mistakes, but it also provides a perverse incentive to ignore
potential warning signs of future fraud in hopes of receiving addi-
tional money in a class action.154  This, in turn, fosters rational igno-
rance and rewards the investor who stays aboard the metaphorical
sinking ship when other investors heeded the warning signs long
before.  In short, if private litigation compensates investors who do
not have out-of-pocket losses, this could (1) prevent individuals from
learning from their investment mistakes and reward ignorance, and
(2) provide a perverse incentive to invest purposefully in companies
with signs of fraud in the hope that they will again receive a litigation
windfall.155
This leaves open the question of whether laws or judicially tai-
lored recoveries should “save investors from themselves.”  Of course,
taking away the choice to sue where investors suffer no net loss can be
seen as yet another paternalistic intervention.  Given that congres-
sional members and judges also suffer from cognitive biases,156 the
153. Id. at 1626 (“[R]esearch from developmental psychology indicates that individuals
improve their decision-making skills over time through a ‘learning by doing’ process, and
that paternalistic policies threaten interference in this self-regulatory process.”).
154. Of course, this theory is not immune to the criticism that minimizing the incentive
for private litigation in certain circumstances is paternalistic in and of itself.  Yet, a steadfast
avoidance of all paternalistic initiatives leads to a return to laissez-faire markets.  See id. at
1653 (“Imposing no choice-set constraint or offering no insurance would represent a lais-
sez-faire stance in which there is no paternalistic oversight of the biased behavior.”).  Recall
the stock market crash of 1929 and the Great Depression that followed, events which coun-
sel against such an approach to securities regulation.
155. There might be an interesting if not persuasive defense here.  If individual or even
institutional investors continually purchased securities that reeked of fraudulent behavior
in hopes of obtaining a windfall recovery in a securities class action, the defendants could
argue that the plaintiffs did not rely on the misrepresentation.  Lack of reliance has been a
traditional defense in face-to-face transactions where reliance is unreasonable. See, e.g.,
Royal Am. Managers, Inc. v. IRC Holding Corp., 885 F.2d 1011, 1015 (2d Cir. 1989) (not-
ing that defendants may disprove reliance by demonstrating plaintiffs negligently failed to
discover true facts).  To make this argument in an open-market case, the defendants would
have to challenge the efficient market hypothesis—a position made easier by the large
body of literature on behavioral finance and noise traders. See, e.g., De Long et al., supra
note 142, at 711–13 (explaining how noise traders may affect prices); Ribstein, supra note R
6, at 138 (arguing that research showing that markets and individuals may be irrational R
challenges the efficient capital market hypothesis); Lynn A. Stout, The Mechanisms of Market
Inefficiency: An Introduction to the New Finance, 28 J. CORP. L. 635, 638 (2003) (suggesting
behavioral finance literature creates a need to reevaluate the efficient market hypothesis).
156. See Christopher R. Drahozal, A Behavioral Analysis of Private Judging, 67 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROBS. 105 (2004) (analyzing the susceptibility of arbitrators to cognitive illusions);
William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Commentary, Structuring Lawmaking to Reduce
Cognitive Bias: A Critical View, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 616, 630–31 (2002) (discussing the types
of cognitive biases likely to affect judges); Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86
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question that follows then is whether an optimal level of paternalism
exists and, if so, who is the administrator?  This Section raises more
questions than it does answers, but Klick and Mitchell offer some pre-
liminary observations on this point.  They contend that “optimal pa-
ternalism represents a mechanism design problem in which a social
planner must consider using more than just the sledgehammer of
constraining choice sets ex ante or providing implicit social insurance
through some form of ex post paternalism.”157  Thus, if one considers
the judiciary an apt social planner, then at least one option is to ne-
gate social insurance by limiting investors to out-of-pocket losses in
private class actions.  The corollary then is that the class action should
not be available to net winners from fraud.  Although arguably pater-
nalistic, this option promotes investor incentive to learn from past in-
vestment errors and takes away one opportunity for class litigation—
and with it the perverse double reward when the net stock price in-
creases after fraud.
B. Private Class Actions Promote Deterrence
Because compensating defrauded investors without out-of-pocket
losses encourages costly wealth transfers among diversified investors
and provides disincentives to learn, compensation should not be the
principal rationale underlying securities fraud class actions.  Instead,
in accord with Congress’s goal of ensuring market integrity,158 private
litigation’s primary objective must be to deter fraud.159  The SEC has
commented that “the overriding purpose of Congress was not so
much to impose liability for the benefit of investors injured by a defec-
tive registration statement but rather to stimulate diligence on the
CORNELL L. REV. 777 (2001) (studying how cognitive biases influence judges); Jeffrey J.
Rachlinski, The Uncertain Psychological Case for Paternalism, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1165,
1199–1201 (2003) (exploring how cognitive biases impact decisionmaking and noting that
judges are sometimes affected by cognitive illusions).
157. Klick & Mitchell, supra note 138, at 1652–53. R
158. See Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647, 664 (1986) (indicating that Congress
intended the 1934 Act to deter fraud and promote disclosure); Affiliated Ute Citizens of
Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972) (noting that Congress sought to improve
business ethics through the 1934 Act).
159. Mahoney, supra note 131, at 636 (“Note that a redistribution among shareholders R
that does not enhance deterrence is every bit as bad as fraud itself.  Just as fraud may lead
to investments in lying and precautions, so the possibility of using litigation as a purely
redistributive tool will lead to excessive investment in litigation.”); see also Frank H. Easter-
brook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV.
669, 693–94 (1984) (arguing that protecting unsophisticated investors should not be the
goal of securities regulation).
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part of those persons who are actually responsible for [its]
preparation.”160
Certainly, securities regulators want to deter the prospective prac-
tice of bundling adverse and favorable information to prevent a stock
price drop and thus potentially prevent class action liability.  And
compensatory damages can, in certain circumstances, promote deter-
rence by compelling officers and directors to internalize the costs and
benefits of their actions.161  But, because class recovery redistributes
wealth among diversified shareholders and could cause perverse ef-
fects on investor education and motivation, perhaps the class action is
not the best vehicle for deterring this type of bundling.162  One prob-
lem with using the class action to deter this practice is that variable
remedies may not accurately pair penalties with the wrongful con-
duct’s social harm.163  Without consensus on how to measure loss,
both attorneys and corporate actors lack a defined starting point for
estimating financial costs.164  Thus, corporate actors have no gauge by
160. Joseph W. Bishop, Jr., New Problems in Indemnifying and Insuring Directors: Protection
Against Liability Under the Federal Securities Laws, 1972 DUKE L.J. 1153, 1162 (quoting Brief
for SEC as Intervenor, Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544
(E.D.N.Y. 1971)).
161. See generally STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 5–21, 127–51
(1987) (discussing theories of levels of care and their effect on deterrence, and analyzing
damages based on the magnitude of liability); Robert Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84
COLUM. L. REV. 1523, 1552 (1984) (arguing that the potential cost of an activity can be
internalized by individuals when deciding how to act).
162. See infra Part III.A.3.
163. See Alexander, supra note 2, at 1493 (noting that the practical calculation of loss in R
class actions is complex and uncertain).  This is not to say that uncertainty about how to
measure damages is the only problem.  Market reaction is also unpredictable.  But a fixed
remedy at least provides a predictable starting point.  Many commentators have explored
ways in which the tort system does not lead to optimal deterrence due to the transactional
costs of litigation and the disparity between social and private incentives. E.g., Susan Rose-
Ackerman & Mark Geistfeld, The Divergence Between Social and Private Incentives to Sue: A
Comment on Shavell, Menell, and Kaplow, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 483 (1987); Steven Shavell, The
Social Versus the Private Incentive to Bring Suit in a Costly Legal System, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 333
(1982).
The deterrence theory is founded on the assumption that the officer or director is a
rational actor and will change her behavior based on the costs and benefits of a situation.
Kevin M. Carlsmith et al., Why Do We Punish?  Deterrence and Just Deserts as Motives for Punish-
ment, 83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 284, 285 (2002).  Academics writing in the field of
behavioral law and economics readily dispute the theory that humans are rational. See
supra note 139 and accompanying text; see also James A. Fanto, Quasi-Rationality in Action: A R
Study of Psychological Factors in Merger Decision-Making, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1333, 1342–47 (2001)
(summarizing the application of behavioral science to law and economics).
164. I take for granted that corporate actors aim to maximize wealth.  Of course, corpo-
rate actors may be motivated by other factors such as saving their jobs or covering previous
wrongdoing.  Yet, corporations generally hire managers to promote the corporation, to act
in its best interests, and to make the corporation profitable.  Thus, I assume, perhaps
naı¨vely, that managers generally want to act in their own best interests, which would in-
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which to judge the detrimental effects of, for example, overly optimis-
tic announcements.  Presumably, if this measurement is known, the
wealth-maximizing actor will avoid conduct that results in costly finan-
cial penalties and society then benefits from accurate corporate
information.165
Given the uncertainty of potential class action damages, how do
corporate actors weigh their behavior?
1. Maximizing Deterrence
Until would-be-violators can approximate the cost of a penalty,
they will be unable to adjust their behavior accordingly.166  Put an-
other way, if a would-be-violator feels that she could face exorbitant
penalties regardless of her actions—a quasi-form of strict liability—
then she may ignore potential consequences and engage in wealth-
maximizing behavior.167  She may then hope that the penalty costs
less than the wealth received from that particular behavior.168  Wealth-
driven corporate managers who contemplate violating the law must
know the costs and the benefits before they can determine whether
the benefits outweigh the expected liability.169  But most private secur-
clude keeping their jobs.  Consequently, because part of their job is to maximize corporate
profits, they must perform this task to act in their own self-interest.
165. Alexander, supra note 2, at 1493. R
166. Erick Gerding explains the deterrence model from an economic perspective:
Were an economist to model the deterrence theory that undergirds the antifraud
rules of the securities law, the decision by a securities issuer or a market interme-
diary (such as a gatekeeper) on whether to commit fraud would look something
like B < > Pd *((Pe * Ll) + Lr), where B represents the benefits to be realized from
committing fraud, Pd represents the probability of the fraud being detected, Pe
represents the probability of the securities laws being successfully enforced, Ll
represents legal liability under the securities laws, and Lr represents market,
reputational and other non-legal losses.
Rational actors contemplating violating the law will do so if the benefits, B,
outweigh the expected liability.
Erik F. Gerding, The Next Epidemic: Bubbles and the Growth and Decay of Securities Regulation, 38
CONN. L. REV. 393, 427–28 (2006).
167. Cf. Pritchard, supra note 24, at 959 (“The cost of litigating securities class actions, R
tied to potentially enormous judgments, ensures that even weak cases will produce a settle-
ment if they are not dismissed before trial.”).
168. See John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance with
Legal Standards, 70 VA. L. REV. 965, 966 (1984) (“If the legal standard is uncertain, even
actors who behave ‘optimally’ in terms of overall social welfare will face some chance of
being held liable because of the unpredictability of the legal rule.”).
169. See Gerding, supra note 166, at 428 (noting that if the benefit outweighs the liabil- R
ity, a rational individual considering violating the law will do so).  A.C. Pritchard identifies
some of the costs of corporate fraud as reduced managerial accountability, higher cost of
liquidity for traders, and, by allowing corporations to raise funds for non-cost-justified in-
vestment projects, improper capital allocation.  Pritchard, supra note 24, at 937–45. R
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ities class actions end in confidential settlement agreements.  Even
those that reach a judge or jury are subject to variable remedies.170
Although most cases never reach a jury, if attorneys could advise
would-be-violators and would-be-litigants on the remedy for securities
violations, that baseline could at least provide a starting point for both
groups to modify their behavior.  Or, perhaps initially more likely,
they could agree upon a more realistic settlement value.  John Calfee
and Richard Craswell identified the difficulty in measuring damages
as one of several pertinent factors that thwart optimal deterrence in
tort law.171  Calfee and Craswell discuss the fallacy that excessive dam-
age awards incentivize overcompliance with the law and, conversely,
that insufficient awards prompt undercompliance.172  Instead, they ar-
gue, uncertainty about the measure and level of damages can produce
both undercompliance and overcompliance (and underdeterrence
and overdeterrence).173  To be sure, this is less than ideal when social
planners aim for optimal deterrence and optimal paternalism.
2. Preventing Substantive “Absolute” Liability and Promoting
Predictability
The Dura Court’s dicta increased instability in measuring loss by
intimating that a corporation might be liable in a class action when its
higher share price is lower than it would have been absent the fraud.
170. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 3, at 611–12 (quoting Hackbart v. Holmes, 675 R
F.2d 1114, 1121 (10th Cir. 1982)).
171. Calfee & Craswell, supra note 168, at 969.  These factors included uncertainty about R
whether would-be-violators will be sued and, if so, uncertainty about the size of the dam-
ages or fine that they would have to pay if found liable. Id. at 968–69.  Of course, even
eliminating the uncertainty about whether there will be enforcement and the amount of
damages does not eliminate all uncertainty.  One of the primary fallacies of securities law is
the concept of materiality.  Given the myriad of judicial approaches to materiality, an of-
ficer or director of a corporation may not know whether her comment or report will be
considered “material.”  Alexander, supra note 2, at 1494 (“For example, a corporation will R
have difficulty weighing the costs and benefits of failing to disclose information if it is
unsure about whether a court would consider that information ‘material.’”); see also Gerd-
ing, supra note 166, at 438–40 (asserting that there are several possible deviations from the R
general idea of materiality based on market conditions and behavioral biases of actors).
172. Calfee & Craswell, supra note 168, at 986. R
173. Id.  Several briefs in Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 (2005), identi-
fied the problem of overdeterrence in fraud-on-the-market situations.  Brief of The Cham-
ber of Commerce of the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 10,
Dura, 544 U.S. 336 (2005) (No. 03-932); Brief of Washington Legal Foundation as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 27, Dura, 544 U.S. 336 (2005) (No. 03-932).  The Su-
preme Court echoed this problem in its opinion by relying on the PSLRA and observing
that the Act “makes clear Congress’ intent to permit private securities fraud actions for
recovery where, but only where, plaintiffs adequately allege and prove the traditional ele-
ments of causation and loss.” Dura, 544 U.S. at 346.
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Unpredictability is evidenced by the increased likelihood that a corpo-
ration may find itself in the midst of a securities class action at some
point—perhaps regardless of its precautions.174  In 2006, NERA Eco-
nomic Consulting reported that, over a five-year period, the average
public company has a ten percent chance of facing a shareholder class
action lawsuit.175  Although there is a forty percent chance that the
court will dismiss the action,176 the mere filing of the suit typically
causes a drop in a company’s stock price.177
Because it often takes months to achieve a final dismissal with
prejudice, the corporation must report the litigation in its public SEC
filings, which may decrease the willingness of new investors to
purchase its securities.  As is often mentioned in the ever-popular class
action critique, getting rid of even frivolous litigation is not free, par-
ticularly when the court is unable to determine (due in part to the
variable calculations of loss) from the face of the pleadings whether
the suit satisfies the pleading standards.178  If the complaint might
eventually plead a prima facie case of fraud, the result is usually a
dismissal without prejudice so that the plaintiffs can, if possible, cor-
rect the deficiency.  This invariably leads to amendments and re-filing,
which starts the cycle all over again.  Clarifying that plaintiffs are enti-
tled to recover only their out-of-pocket losses could facilitate earlier
dismissal of actions without net loss.
174. A.C. Pritchard observes that if plaintiffs survive a motion to dismiss, then defend-
ants usually settle because settling tends to be cheaper than litigation.  Pritchard, supra
note 24, at 952.  I would extend this period beyond the motion to dismiss stage and to the R
class certification stage.  Defendants are generally willing to prolong the litigation if they
have a plausible argument that the plaintiffs’ cannot meet the certification standards for
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.  Consequently, they will generally wait to settle until
after the court certifies a class.
175. MILLER ET AL., supra note 117, at 3. R
176. Id.
177. Coffee, supra note 4, at 6; see also Arlen & Carney, supra note 4, at 699 (“Revelation R
of the fraud, and of the corporation’s prospective liability, has an immediate impact on the
price of the issuing corporation’s stock: the price adjusts to reflect both the truth previ-
ously concealed by the fraud and the corporation’s expected liability for the fraud.”).
178. The Supreme Court observed in Dura that the pleading requirements on plaintiffs
are not unduly burdensome:
[Pleading requires only] “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief.” . . .
. . . [I]t should not prove burdensome for a plaintiff who has suffered an
economic loss to provide a defendant with some indication of the loss and the
causal connection that the plaintiff has in mind.
544 U.S. at 346–47 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)).  Accordingly, it is not far-fetched to
think that the Supreme Court would encourage dismissal of claims that fail to demonstrate
economic loss.  The variable, of course, is how that loss is measured.
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For now, the upshot of corporations experiencing at least a ten
percent probability of a securities class action means that the officers
and directors must plan for such an occurrence.179  The result is not
overly cautious and pessimistic statements (for corporate agents would
not last long by failing to appropriately promote the corporation), but
rather is a budgetary allocation for officer and director insurance as
well as for class action litigation.  When the judicial system effectively
holds defendants unconditionally liable by prompting them to build
securities class actions into their budget—regardless of whether they
have committed fraud—then defendants have little incentive to take
excessive precautionary measures.  If the funds (or the directors’ and
officers’ insurance policies)180 are already available, why should man-
agement be more realistic in its financial reports?181  Though volatile
market reactions generate a great deal of insecurity as well, a consen-
sus on the appropriate remedy (and thus what constitutes a loss)
could facilitate earlier dismissal of suits where plaintiffs are unable to
demonstrate net losses, and it could give corporate planners at least
some degree of predictability in analyzing their conduct in financial
terms.182
IV. LIMITING PRIVATE CLASS RECOVERY TO NET LOSSES
As espoused throughout this Article, one option for remedying
open-market fraud is to restrict plaintiffs’ recovery to out-of-pocket
losses.  This would compensate only net monetary losses.183  Although
it seems relatively simple, this rule has broader practical and theoreti-
cal ramifications.  First, unlike other common law remedies, the out-
of-pocket rule compensates plaintiffs only for the loss caused by the
fraud and therefore aligns with the stringent loss causation require-
ments and the limitation on “actual damages” in 15 U.S.C.
179. Coffee, supra note 4, at 21. R
180. See id. at 23–24 (noting that insurance usually pays settlement amounts); Pritchard,
supra note 24, at 956 (explaining how corporations acquire directors’ and officers’ insur- R
ance to limit exposure); see also supra note 4 and accompanying text. R
181. Granted, if managers use their budgetary allocation for securities class action litiga-
tion then they will have to replenish it.  Consequently, they do have some incentive to
avoid fraud and prevent corporate loss.  Yet, managers without this sort of budgetary re-
quirement at all might have greater incentives to avoid fraud.
182. I recognize that limiting plaintiffs to out-of-pocket losses decreases the class ac-
tion’s deterrence value as applied to a corporation that attempts to avoid liability by bun-
dling favorable and adverse information.  There are, however, other adequate means for
deterring that situation. See infra Part IV.C.
183. This complies with Dura’s requirement that “a plaintiff . . . show not only that had
he known the truth he would not have acted but also that he suffered actual economic
loss.”  Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 343–44 (2005).
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§ 78bb(a).184  Second, it supplies a predictable foundation for judging
the reliability of expert methodology that purports to prove economic
loss and injury.185  Third, limiting plaintiffs to their out-of-pocket
losses facilitates earlier dismissal of suits that provide double recov-
eries to investors and that create an incentive to invest purposefully in
companies showing signs of fraud.186  Finally, this limit could bolster
the class action’s deterrence value through increased predictability.187
A. Out-of-Pocket Losses Provide the Best Fit for Modern Securities Fraud
Restricting the plaintiff class’s recovery to its out-of-pocket losses
recognizes that open-market fraud is a tort and that the company is
being held vicariously liable.188  Unlike other remedies that are con-
tract- and equity-based, the out-of-pocket measure resonates with the
realities of open-market fraud.
1. Out-of-Pocket Recoveries Comply with the Loss Causation Standard
Despite its relative ambiguity, after Dura, the loss causation ele-
ment plainly mandates that plaintiffs tie the loss for which they seek
damages to the defendant’s misrepresentation or omission.189  It fol-
lows that, if liable, defendants should compensate plaintiffs only for
those losses.  Consequently, a typical rescissory measure of loss, which
aims to restore the parties to the position they would have been in
absent the fraud, should not be available because it would require the
defendant to reimburse the plaintiffs for losses caused by both fraud
and changes in the market.190
In the same manner, loss causation limits unjust enrichment
damages.  In the gold-platinum hypothetical, the corporation’s stock
price increased after the disclosure of no gold and the announced
discovery of platinum.  Thus, the corporation arguably received an in-
184. See infra Part IV.A.1–2.
185. See infra Part IV.A.3.
186. See supra Part III.A.3.
187. See supra Part III.B.2.  To be sure, limiting plaintiffs’ recovery to net losses inhibits
the class action’s ability to deter corporations from bundling favorable and adverse infor-
mation to avoid class action liability.  But the SEC, Department of Justice, and exchanges
can still deter that type of behavior. See infra Part IV.C.
188. See supra notes 105–110 and accompanying text (discussing the indirect benefits R
that corporations may receive from undiscovered fraud).
189. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4) (2000).
190. See Thompson, supra note 18, at 1180 n.12 (asserting that when there is an overall R
market decline following fraud, rescission makes defendants pay the difference).  Note,
however, that the defendant would only be responsible for ninety days worth of changes
because Congress has determined that this particular point in time is the appropriate pe-
riod for market adjustment.  15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(e)(2).
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direct benefit from the platinum discovery.  But the platinum discov-
ery cannot enter the damage equation because the defendant’s
indirect profit from that discovery is unconnected to the plaintiffs’
gold-related losses.  Apart from a possible attempt to avoid liability by
bundling adverse and favorable news, there is no link between the
stock price increase based on the platinum discovery and the alleged
decrease from the absence of gold.  In other words, there can be a
lack of gold without the addition of platinum.  A plaintiff is entitled to
reimbursement only for loss caused by the misrepresentation or omis-
sion.191  Disgorgement is not an appropriate remedy for that loss be-
cause disgorgement purges indirect benefits obtained by the
corporation; it does not award damages based only on the loss caused
by the misdeed.  Moreover, where the defendant would have obtained
the benefit even without the fraud, disgorgement is not appropri-
ate.192  In short, even though Dura suggested that a private plaintiff
might bring an action when a share’s higher price is lower than it
would have been absent the fraud, a court should not require the cor-
poration to purge itself of any indirect benefits it obtained from its
unrelated positive news.193
2. Out-of-Pocket Losses Conform with 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a)’s “Actual
Damages” Limit
Restricting plaintiffs to out-of-pocket recoveries also complies
with § 78bb(a)’s “actual damages” cap.194  This section’s language lim-
191. Robbins v. Koger Props., Inc., 116 F.3d 1441, 1447 n.5 (11th Cir. 1997).
192. Thompson, supra note 70, at 386–87. R
193. Perhaps it is the attorneys that are unjustly enriched.  For an article suggesting the
truth of this statement, see Langevoort, supra note 21, at 651. R
194. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a); see also Pelletier v. Stuart-James Co., 863 F.2d 1550, 1557 (11th
Cir. 1989) (explaining actual damages limitation to mean some form of economic loss);
Harris v. Union Elec. Co., 787 F.2d 355, 367 (8th Cir. 1986) (acknowledging that actual
damages are measured by determining a plaintiff’s out-of-pocket loss); Madigan, Inc. v.
Goodman, 498 F.2d 233, 239–40 (7th Cir. 1974) (recognizing that only out-of-pocket losses
are recoverable in fraud litigation); Levine v. Seilon, Inc., 439 F.2d 328, 333–35 (2d Cir.
1971) (stating that a plaintiff is only able to recover actual damages and rejecting other
damage claims); Estate Counseling Serv., Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., 303 F.2d 527, 533 (10th Cir. 1962) (finding the demonstration of actual damages to
be essential to a securities fraud claim).  Not all courts have read the term “actual dam-
ages” to exclude benefit-of-the-bargain damages. See, e.g., Osofsky v. Zipf, 645 F.2d 107, 114
(2d Cir. 1981) (allowing plaintiff to recover benefit-of-the-bargain damages where the de-
fendant misrepresented the amount of consideration in proxy solicitation materials); John
R. Lewis Inc. v. Newman, 446 F.2d 800, 805 (5th Cir. 1971) (upholding damages award that
included a jury’s determination of the fair market value of the stock that plaintiffs did not
actually receive).
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its plaintiffs to “actual damages” caused by the misdeed.195  Most
courts construe this term to mean some form of economic loss and
limit awards to those that are strictly compensatory in nature.196  Ac-
cordingly, “actual damages” would not include speculative lost profits
from benefit-of-the-bargain or expectation remedies.197
Some courts have, however, assessed rescissory damages even
under the “actual damages” theory by reasoning that this award must
be “reduced by any value received as a result of the fraudulent transac-
tion.”198  The Supreme Court, in Randall v. Loftsgaarden,199 assumed,
because neither party challenged it, that rescissory recoveries could
sometimes be proper for a section 10(b) case.200  It thought that “in
some circumstances” there was authority allowing the section 10(b)
plaintiff to choose between “undoing the bargain” or “holding the de-
fendant to the bargain by requiring him to pay [out-of-pocket] dam-
ages.”201  Yet, Randall is distinguishable for our purposes: it concerned
a situation where privity of contract existed and did not address an
open-market context.202
After the Court’s Dura decision, if presented with the issue of
whether rescission is appropriate to remedy open-market fraud, the
Court would likely decide that defendants must reimburse plaintiffs
only for economic losses actually caused by the misdeed.  This would
effectively bar rescissory damages that compensate plaintiffs for non-
fraud related losses.  Even if the “actual damages” language does not
preclude rescissory damages, it seems that loss causation, which re-
quires a causal connection between the loss and the misrepresenta-
195. Specifically, this section states that “no person . . . shall recover, through satisfac-
tion of judgment in one or more actions, a total amount in excess of his actual damages on
account of the act complained of.”  15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a); see also In re Control Data Corp.
Sec. Litig., 933 F.2d 616, 622 (8th Cir. 1991) (affirming lower court’s limitation of damages
to losses caused by accounting fraud, the act complained of).  Some courts dispute that
§ 78bb contains a limit and contend that “there cannot be any one rule of damages pre-
scribed which will apply in all cases, even where it is conceded that the finding must be
limited to actual damages.” Osofsky, 645 F.2d at 111.
196. Pelletier, 863 F.2d at 1557–58; see also Jones v. Miles, 656 F.2d 103, 107 n.8 (5th Cir.
1981) (“Actual damages . . . has been interpreted to mean some form of economic loss and
does not include punitive damages.”).
197. Pelletier, 863 F.2d at 1557–58 (citing Wolf v. Frank, 477 F.2d 467, 478 (5th Cir.
1973)); Harris v. Am. Inv. Co., 523 F.2d 220, 225 (8th Cir. 1975); Sound Video Unlimited,
Inc. v. Video Shack Inc., 700 F. Supp. 127, 142 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
198. Austin v. Loftsgaarden, 675 F.2d 168, 181 (8th Cir. 1982).
199. 478 U.S. 647 (1986).
200. Id. at 661–62.
201. Id. at 662 (internal quotation marks omitted).
202. Privity of contract existed in Randall because the plaintiffs had purchased interests
in a limited partnership organized by the defendant. Id. at 650.
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tion or omission, would.203  Accordingly, the loss causation element
and the “actual damages” restriction confine litigants to recovery for
their out-of-pocket losses.
3. Proving Hypothetical Damages
Even though proving damages is never a simple endeavor, the
out-of-pocket rule may require less speculation than other measures.
For any defrauded purchaser to recover, she must establish the differ-
ence between the value of what she actually received and the value of
what she would have received absent the misrepresentation.204  In the
gold-platinum situation, because the stock price never actually de-
clined, any damage calculation would have to be speculative.205
Granted, assessing damages in that hypothetical would be somewhat
easier because both gold and platinum have a fixed market value.  But
this exercise becomes increasingly arcane without fixed values.  Any
attempt to measure loss must isolate the value of the misrepresenta-
203. See supra Part III.A.
204. This value cannot include damages covering “the expected fruits of an unrealized
speculation.”  Sigafus v. Porter, 179 U.S. 116, 125 (1900).  The Supreme Court adopted
this fundamental rule as the basic measure of damages under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-
5. See Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 155 (1972) (“In our
view, the correct measure of damages . . . is the difference between the fair value of all that
the . . . seller received and the fair value of what he would have received had there been no
fraudulent conduct . . . .”); see also Garnatz v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., 559 F.2d 1357, 1360
(8th Cir. 1977) (stating that damages are calculated by the difference between the
purchase price of the securities and their actual value); Foster v. Fin. Tech. Inc., 517 F.2d
1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 1975) (“As in all 10b-5 cases, [plaintiffs’] damages are limited by what
they would have realized if they had acted upon their claim when they first learned of the
fraud or had reason to know of it.”); Madigan, Inc. v. Goodman, 498 F.2d 233, 239 (7th
Cir. 1974) (“A defendant was bound to make good the loss sustained, such as the moneys
the plaintiff had paid out and interest, and any other outlay legitimately attributable to
defendant’s fraudulent conduct; but this liability did not include the expected fruits of an
unrealized speculation.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades,
491 F.2d 402, 412–13 (3d Cir. 1974) (explaining that Affiliated Ute Citizens provides clear
guidance for determining damages); Wolf v. Frank, 477 F.2d 467, 478 (5th Cir. 1973)
(finding that the out-of-pocket rule does not cover expected speculative profit); Richard-
son v. MacArthur, 451 F.2d 35, 43 (10th Cir. 1971) (stating that the plaintiff is “entitled to
be compensated only to the extent that he received less than what he was entitled to under
the agreement”); Levine v. Seilon, Inc. 439 F.2d 328, 334 (2d Cir. 1971) (noting that,
contrary to some courts’ holdings, damages are not the difference between the value of
what the buyer received and what was represented the buyer would be getting); Janigan v.
Taylor, 344 F.2d 781, 786 (1st Cir. 1965) (recognizing that damages do not cover “the
expected fruits of an unrealized speculation”); see also KEETON ET AL., supra note 63, § 110. R
205. John Coffee has termed this general type of loss “phantom losses.” See supra note 6. R
He observed that “to permit recovery in this case hypothesized by the Court [in Dura] is to
permit recovery based on a double speculation—first, as to the original uncorroborated
price inflation and, second, as to what would have been the later price increase in the
absence of discovery of the original inflation.”  Coffee, Loss Causation, supra note 6. R
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tion (or omission)—i.e., the gold discovery—and remove from con-
sideration both the platinum announcement and any added value
that could accrue from the gold-platinum combination.
Given the speculative nature of claims where no price decline oc-
curs after a corporation discloses a misrepresentation,206 the plaintiff
class should put forth in the complaint sufficient evidence of out-of-
pocket loss to survive a motion to dismiss.207  Expert testimony on
class losses would likely become a vital part of establishing plaintiffs’
prima facie case.208  But, even once a court establishes that only out-
of-pocket losses are compensable, there is no single universally ac-
cepted expert model for proving these losses.209
The most typical model is the event study, which uses an expert to
construct a “value line” that theoretically represents the stock’s “true
value” if purchasers knew the undisclosed information on each day of
the class period.  Then, in theory, the expert can assess individual loss
for each class member by comparing the price actually paid with the
value line construct.210  Because investors often buy and sell shares
206. Claims where the stock price did not actually decline are speculative because the
lack of a decline could mean that the market did not consider the information material.
Consequently, plaintiffs would not be able to prove that they relied on a “material misrep-
resentation,” and could not plead a prima facie case of securities fraud.
207. See Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 342 (2005) (finding that the Ninth
Circuit was incorrect in stating that a plaintiff need only prove that “the price on the date of
purchase was inflated because of the misrepresentation” (internal quotation marks omit-
ted)); see also In re Daou Sys., Inc., 411 F.3d 1006, 1027 (9th Cir. 2005) (concluding that the
plaintiffs’ assertions of loss were sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss); cf. Anza v. Ideal
Steel Supply Corp., 126 S. Ct. 1991, 2002 (2006) (“Certainly the plaintiff in this case, as in
all tort cases involving damage to business, must demonstrate that he suffered a harm
caused by the tort, and not merely by external market conditions.”).  For the elements of a
claim involving publicly traded securities, see supra note 38 and accompanying text. R
208. See generally RMED Int’l, Inc. v. Sloan’s Supermarkets, Inc., No. 94 Civ. 5587 PKL
RLE, 2000 WL 310352 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2000) (permitting expert testimony to help estab-
lish damages at trial); see also In re Gaming Lottery Sec. Litig., No. 96 Civ. 5567 (RPP), 2000
WL 193125, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2000) (permitting expert evidence as to damages by a
professor of finance).
209. See, e.g., In re Broadcom Corp. Sec. Litig., No. SACV01275GLTMLGX, 2005 WL
1403756, at *2 (S.D. Cal. June 2, 2005) (concluding that the PSLRA “leaves it open for a
court to select the most reliable method of damages proof that is available in that particu-
lar case”); John Finnerty & George Pushner, An Improved Two-Trader Model for Measuring
Damages in Securities Fraud Class Actions, 8 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 213, 215 (2003).
210. Alexander, supra note 2 at 1490–92.  Professor Alexander explains the process in R
two steps:
The first step is to determine the “per-share damages,” the amount of the actual
market price attributable to the nondisclosure on each day of the class period.
The second step is to determine the aggregate damages of the class.  To deter-
mine per-share damages, an expert economic witness constructs a “value line”
which represents the “true value” of the stock—what purchasers would have been
willing to pay if they had known the undisclosed information—on each day of the
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\66-2\MLR202.txt unknown Seq: 44 12-FEB-07 15:33
2007] REASSESSING DAMAGES IN SECURITIES FRAUD CLASS ACTIONS 391
within the class period, the methodology for assessing loss should ac-
count for in-and-out traders and provide a mechanism to net their
windfalls against their losses to calculate net loss.211
Despite widespread use of the event study to demonstrate market
reaction, the study can show only that the market reacted to the dis-
closure; it cannot prove why.212  Even experts relying on the same data
and facts often present competing inferences regarding the amount
class period.  The damages sustained by any particular member of the class can
then, in theory, be determined by comparing the price actually paid with the
value line for the date of the transaction.
Id. at 1491.
211. There are several proposals for damage models that take this into account. See, e.g.,
Janet Cooper Alexander, The Value of Bad News in Securities Class Actions, 41 UCLA L. REV.
1421, 1458–62 (1994) (contending that “the trades of ‘ins-and-outs’ must be estimated
through a statistical model,” and proposing that damage awards be based on proof of indi-
vidual claims, rather than on the proportional trading model); Jon Koslow, Note, Estimat-
ing Aggregate Damages in Class-Action Litigation Under Rule 10b-5 for Purposes of Settlement, 59
FORDHAM L. REV. 811, 831–34 (1991) (proposing a proportional trading model and an
accelerated trading model).  Given that the appropriate model may vary based upon the
facts of the case, this Article does not promote a particular model.  Instead, given the loss
causation requirement, it recommends that any appropriate model should account for in-
and-out traders and provide a mechanism to net their windfalls against their losses.  For an
overview of some of the different types of models, see Robert A. Alessi, The Emerging Judicial
Hostility to the Typical Damages Model Employed by Plaintiffs in Securities Class Action Lawsuits, 56
BUS. LAW. 483 (2001). Alessi observes that the Proportional Decay Model does not account
for in-and-out purchasers and has thus been subject to Daubert scrutiny. Id. at 487, 489–90.
Daniel Fischel and David Ross’s research provides some indicia of how important it is
to take in-and-out purchasers into account when calculating damages.  Daniel R. Fischel &
David J. Ross, The Use of Trading Models to Estimate Aggregate Damages in Securities Fraud Litiga-
tion: A Proposal for Change, in SECURITIES CLASS ACTIONS: ABUSES AND REMEDIES 131 (Edward
J. Yodowitz et al. eds., 1994).  In one particular case, they observed that “[m]any of these
institutions were ‘out-and-in’ during 1990: these institutions sold approximately 14 million
shares [23% of the 60 million shares] during the year prior to their purchases of shares
that they held until year-end.  Thus, only 77% of the retained shares were retained by
shareholders who were not out-and-in.” Id. at 138.
212. Ribstein, supra note 6, at 157; see also Langevoort, supra note 121, at 177 (“Event R
study methodology can still be utilized to test for whether or when adjustment has oc-
curred—i.e., abnormal returns disappear—over substantial periods of time.”).  Event stud-
ies generally start by identifying the change in price on the date of the disclosure and then
use a regression analysis to eliminate market changes that are not caused by the fraud.
The study then works backwards to establish a hypothetical price for each day. See generally
RONALD J. GILSON & BERNARD S. BLACK, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS
185–228 (2d ed. 1995) (explaining how event studies measure market changes caused by
new information).  For an explanation of the market model, see Daniel R. Fischel, Use of
Modern Finance Theory in Securities Fraud Cases, 38 BUS. LAW. 1, 17–19 (1982).  Fischel
explains:
The [market] model is based on the observable correlation between the return
on a particular security and the return on the entire market when viewed over
time.  Once this historically observed correlation is determined, it is possible to
predict what the return of a given security should be on a certain date given the
return for the market as a whole.
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of harm.213  Add to this an extended period between the misrepresen-
tation and the disclosure—as was the case in Dura214—and there is an
increased potential for non-related events to affect the market
price.215  Loss causation requires plaintiffs to demonstrate a causal
connection between the misrepresentation (or omission) and the eco-
nomic loss.216  Assuming liability, it follows that defendants have to
compensate plaintiffs only for losses caused by the fraud.  Accord-
ingly, courts must take precautions to ensure that experts’ methods
extract non-related factors affecting price from their calculation.217
B. Earlier Dismissal of Suits Providing Double Recovery
Though exact measures of loss generally come at the end of liti-
gation, the calculation method is important at the outset to ascertain
whether plaintiffs experienced a net economic loss for purposes of
pleading a prima facie case of securities fraud.218  It is axiomatic that
213. Id. at 17 (footnote omitted).
Alexander, supra note 211, at 1422; Kenneth R. Cone & James E. Laurence, How Accu- R
rate are Estimates of Aggregate Damages in Securities Fraud Cases?, 49 BUS. LAW. 505 (1994);
Ribstein, supra note 6, at 157. R
214. Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 342–43 (2005).
215. Langevoort, supra note 121, at 177–78. R
216. Dura, 544 U.S. at 342.
217. The primary means for ensuring that experts isolate damages caused by fraud is the
Daubert analysis; whenever plaintiffs use experts to demonstrate injury and economic loss,
courts should test the method using the Daubert factors.  Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael,
526 U.S. 137 (1999); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).  For
additional information on how courts conduct the Daubert analysis, see L. Elizabeth Cham-
blee, Comment, Between “Merit Inquiry” and “Rigorous Analysis”: Using Daubert to Navigate the
Gray Areas of Federal Class Action Certification, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1041, 1051–54 (2004).  If
plaintiffs use expert evidence to counter a motion to dismiss alleging that they either lack
standing or failed to state a claim because they suffered no economic loss, then the court
should conduct a Daubert test (even at this early stage) to probe the expert’s methodology
and validity.  A motion opposing class certification or a motion for summary judgment may
also present this issue.  Issues of standing or failure to state a claim for lack of economic
loss might appear in a motion opposing class certification in the form of a challenge to the
adequacy of the representative under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.  As I have argued
elsewhere, courts should use Daubert earlier in the litigation process to help determine
whether plaintiffs have pled their prima facie case. Id.  The monetary amount may, be-
cause of various court rulings, change throughout the course of litigation.  But the expert’s
method and the plaintiffs’ complaint should demonstrate, if true, that plaintiffs suffered
an economic injury.  The court should then dismiss the action if (1) plaintiffs’ complaint
fails to allege that they suffered an out-of-pocket loss where plaintiffs were net losers from
the fraud or (2) plaintiffs’ expert’s method—not amount—of calculating damage cannot
survive a Daubert inquiry.
218. In Dura, the Supreme Court affirmed that, to plead securities fraud, plaintiffs need
to provide only a “short and plain statement” to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 8.  544 U.S. at 346.  The complaint must still “provide the defendant with ‘fair notice
of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Id. (quoting Conley
v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).
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plaintiffs must have an injury (an economic loss) before they can sue.
As noted at the outset of this Article, Congress passed the PSLRA, in
part, to facilitate earlier dismissal of securities class actions that do not
plead a prima facie case.  But without a doctrinal statement limiting
plaintiffs’ compensation to their out-of-pocket losses, courts are often
unable to verify from the initial pleadings whether plaintiffs suffered
compensable losses.
The important consideration in assessing loss is not the monetary
amount, which will fluctuate based on rulings regarding the class pe-
riod and in-and-out purchasers, but the method.  The methodology
should account for in-and-out traders and provide a mechanism to net
plaintiffs’ windfalls against their losses to establish net loss.  The piv-
otal question is then: assuming that everything in the plaintiffs’ com-
plaint is true and that the expert’s method for calculating out-of-
pocket loss is sound, did these plaintiffs experience a net loss?
If the answer to that question is “no,” then, when the defendant
files a motion to dismiss based on the plaintiffs’ failure to state a
claim, the court should consider dismissal.  Granted, if the pleading
error is an oversight and the possibility of compensable loss exists,
then the court could either dismiss the action without prejudice and
permit plaintiffs to correct the error or give plaintiffs leave to amend
the complaint.  But, if according to the facts stated in the complaint,
plaintiffs could not establish a net loss under the out-of-pocket rule,
then the court should dismiss the action with prejudice.
Increasing dismissals for cases without out-of-pocket losses accom-
plishes several goals.219  First, it helps ensure that the remedy roughly
approximates the true financial harm of the violation.220  Second, if
damage awards compensate only out-of-pocket losses, courts may dis-
miss securities class actions that present a potential double reward for
investors who have not experienced a true net loss.  Third, compensat-
ing investors for only their out-of-pocket losses alleviates—but does
not eliminate—the problem that securities class actions generally re-
distribute wealth among diversified shareholders.  Finally, limiting re-
covery in this manner gives both parties guidance about value when
219. One of the primary criticisms with earlier dismissal is that it does not permit plain-
tiffs the necessary discovery needed to develop their case.  While there are many compo-
nents to this debate, suffice it to say that additional discovery would probably not change
whether plaintiffs experienced a net loss based on the out-of-pocket rule.  That informa-
tion is primarily in the hands of the plaintiffs.
220. The social costs are a different story.  Fraud, even when it ultimately makes inves-
tors wealthier, harms the market’s integrity.  But there are other mechanisms for deterring
fraud besides the class action.  These alternatives are increasingly important where inves-
tors do not suffer an economic loss.
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negotiating settlements.  If a corporate defendant believes it has a fair
chance of dismissal, then it may feel less pressure to settle early in the
litigation.  Similarly, plaintiffs’ attorneys, who are paid on a contin-
gency fee basis, are less likely to bring certain actions if they know that
a court will not compensate plaintiffs with net gains.
C. Optimizing Deterrence Through Increased Predictability
Reimbursing only out-of-pocket loss may also bolster the class ac-
tion’s ability to deter fraud.  Because “unpredictable damages” is one
of the factors that undermines optimal deterrence,221 confining plain-
tiffs to an out-of-pocket recovery could increase deterrence by increas-
ing predictability.  This restriction also improves deterrence by
making it easier for judges to discern when to dismiss actions that do
not allege compensable economic loss, as defined by the out-of-pocket
standard.  Admittedly, unpredictability also comes from uncertain
market reaction to fraud and from variable expert calculation meth-
ods.  Predicting damages when a corporation is trying to gauge the
economic harm of issuing a restatement is almost impossible given the
impulsive nature of market reaction.  Still, in formulating a worst-case
scenario, the certainty of knowing how a court will remedy loss and
award damages helps.  Even though setting a fixed method for assess-
ing loss does not ameliorate problems with unpredictability, it does
offer parties a starting point for tabulating potential damage awards.
Moreover, if we assume that corporate actors aim to maximize
wealth and that they weigh their behaviors to ascertain which attrib-
utes are the most cost effective, then they can adjust their behavior
accordingly if the financial costs are known.  This idea may assume too
much given that plaintiffs often bring securities class actions based on
significant market fluctuations rather than firm knowledge of corpo-
rate wrongdoing.  Of course, social planners could also manipulate
other variables to increase deterrence.  Although each of these vari-
ables could merit its own law review article, collectively they might
include defining actionable conduct, making a sanction a predictable
consequence of wrongful conduct, targeting sanctions at wrongdoers
rather than at corporations, and providing specific guidelines for
when sanctions might be imposed.  Suffice it to say that, for our pur-
poses, agreement on a remedy for fraud-on-the-market will at least
provide the start of increased predictability (and thus increased deter-
221. See supra note 171 and accompanying text (discussing Calfee and Craswell’s re- R
search that “difficulty measuring damages” is one of the factors that thwart optimal deter-
rence in tort law).
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rence) even though it will not, on its own, produce optimal
deterrence.
Because the securities class action functions to deter fraud, one of
the primary concerns about limiting the class action’s availability to
those who experienced a net loss is that corporate wrongdoing could
go undeterred.  Yet there are alternative means of enforcement, such
as the Department of Justice, the exchanges, and the SEC.  Because
most antifraud enforcement efforts do not come from private class
actions, statistics suggest that limiting the availability of private class
actions does not mean that fraud will go undeterred or
unpunished.222
Statistics show that the Department of Justice, the exchanges, and
the SEC—not private class actions—already carry out most enforce-
ment and deterrent efforts.223  From 2000 to 2002, private plaintiffs
initiated an average of only 205 securities class actions as opposed to
the 5,101 actions initiated by the SEC, Department of Justice, States,
National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD), and the New York
Stock Exchange (NYSE).224  Further, as compared with the average
from 2000 to 2002, the 2005 statistics indicate that SEC enforcement
actions increased and private actions decreased.225  In 2005, the SEC
initiated 630 actions, which is a significant increase compared with the
average of 528 from 2000 to 2002.226  Moreover, class action filings
decreased from 247 in 2004 to 209 in 2005.227
All in all, these statistics demonstrate that corporate fraud will not
go unpunished or undeterred if plaintiffs cannot bring a class action
when they do not experience a net monetary loss.  Unlike in private
securities class actions, the SEC need not prove damage, injury (eco-
nomic loss), or reliance in order to maintain an action.228  Conse-
222. See infra app.
223. See infra app.
224. Howell E. Jackson, Variation in the Intensity of Financial Regulation: Preliminary Evi-
dence and Potential Implications 27 (Harvard, John M. Olin Center for Law, Econ. & Bus.,
Discussion Paper No. 521, 2005), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?ab-
stract_id=839250; see also infra app.  Yet, these comparatively few class action settlements
and trials resulted in a total award of $1,923,959,333, whereas the total public enforcement
effort (not including arbitrations by the NASD or NYSE) resulted in sanctions of
$1,864,409,277.  Jackson, supra, at 27.
225. See infra app.
226. See infra app.
227. See infra app.
228. SEC v. Rana Research, Inc., 8 F.3d 1358, 1363 n.4 (9th Cir. 1993); SEC v. Rind, 991
F.2d 1486, 1490 (9th Cir. 1993); BROMBERG & LOWENFELS, supra note 17, § 9:1 n.10.  The R
Department of Justice does not have to meet the normal standing requirements of private
plaintiffs either.  GFL Advantage Fund, Ltd. v. Colkitt, 272 F.3d 189, 206 n.6 (3d Cir.
2001).
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quently, the SEC’s enforcement and deterrence efforts would not be
affected by limiting private class actions to net losers who experienced
out-of-pocket losses from the fraud.  Thus, enforcement mechanisms
exist to deter even the situation presented by the gold-platinum hypo-
thetical, where the share’s higher price was lower than it might other-
wise have been absent the fraud.  Accordingly, social planners should
consider limiting the availability of the securities fraud class action to
investors who experienced out-of-pocket losses.  Such a limitation
could result in at least a small measure of increased predictability and
could bolster the private securities class action’s deterrence ability
against traditional fraud that causes a stock price decline.
V. CONCLUSION
My intention in this Article is not to imply that simply limiting
investors to their out-of-pocket losses will provide a quick “fix” for the
ills of the securities class action system.  Instead, I hoped to highlight
some of the intrinsic problems that could result from compensating
investors with a net gain and from stretching traditional common law
remedies to fit modern securities fraud class actions.  Indeed, the out-
of-pocket measure is the only common law remedy that recognizes the
distinctions between face-to-face transactions and open-market fraud,
complies with the loss causation requirement, and limits plaintiffs to
their actual damages.  Awarding investors only their out-of-pocket
losses is a specific remedy that advances optimal deterrence through
clarity and predictability.  Although experts will often differ over
methodologies,229 identifying the appropriate remedy at least pro-
vides a knowable starting point.  Consequently, if the post-Dura courts
encounter their own variation of the gold-platinum hypothetical, I am
cautiously optimistic that they might consider the broader conse-
quences of compensating investors for more than their out-of-pocket
losses and limit damage awards accordingly.
229. E.g., Alexander, supra note 2, at 1488 (“Expert testimony is required to calculate R
damages, and that testimony is contradictory even when the experts purport to be using
the same methodology.”); see also Alexander, supra note 211, at 1421–22 (arguing that cal- R
culation of damages in securities class actions deserves more attention); Cornell & Morgan,
supra note 21, at 883–84 (recommending the application of finance theory to determine R
damages in fraud-on-the-market cases); Koslow, supra note 211, at 811 (asserting that dam- R
age models based on finance theory fail to estimate accurately aggregate damages for the
class); Baruch Lev & Meiring de Villiers, Stock Price Crashes and 10b-5 Damages: A Legal,
Economic, and Policy Analysis, 47 STAN. L. REV. 7 (1994) (proposing a model for calculating
damages that accounts for the sudden price drop after a disclosure).
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APPENDIX
Public Enforcement (Annual Averages:
Effort 2000–2002)230 2005
SEC Actions 528 630231
DOJ Prosecutions 101232 122233
Exchange Enforcement (Annual Averages: 2005
Effort 2000–2002)234
NASD Actions 1,268 1,399235
NYSE Actions 240 196236
NASD Arbitrations Filed 6,725237 6,074238
NYSE Arbitrations Filed 595 464239
Total Exchange 8,826 8,133Enforcement
Private Enforcement (Annual Averages: 2004 2005
Actions 2000–2002)
Class Action Filings 205240 247241 209242in Federal Court
230. Data in this column come from Jackson, supra note 224, at 27. R
231. SEC, SELECT SEC AND MARKET DATA FISCAL 2005, at 3, available at http://www.sec.
gov/about/secstats2005.pdf.  The SEC reported that, in 2005, it initiated 947
investigations, 335 civil proceedings, and 294 administrative proceedings.  SEC, 2005
PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 7 (2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/
about/secpar/secpar2005.pdf.
232. In July 2002, the Department of Justice started a corporate fraud task force.  From
the time it started the task force to the time of publishing its 2002 Annual Report, the
Department of Justice opened more than 130 corporate fraud matters.  U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS’ ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT 29 (2002), available at http://www.
usdoj.gov/usao/reading_room/reports/asr2002/02_stat_book.pdf.
233. This figure represents the number of new corporate fraud matters opened in 2005
by the Department of Justice. Id. at 27.
234. Data in this column come from Jackson, supra note 224, at 27. R
235. NASD Statistics, http://www.nasd.com/PressRoom/Statistics/index.htm (last
visited Dec. 3, 2006).
236. NYSE Enforcement, http://www.nyse.com/regulation/memberorganizations/
1022221394131.html (last visited Dec. 3, 2006).  The NYSE reports that of the 196 cases it
prosecuted, 58 were against member firms and 138 were against individuals. Id.
237. NASD II Dispute Resolution Statistics, http://www.nasd.com/Arbitration
Mediation/NASDDisputeResolution/Statistics/index.htm (last visited Dec. 3, 2006).
238. Id.
239. NYSE Arbitration Statistics, http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/ARB_STATISTICS_TWO_
PAGES_6-1-06.pdf (last visited Dec. 3, 2006).
240. Jackson, supra note 224, at 27. R
241. MILLER ET AL., supra note 117, at 2. R
242. Id.
